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INTRODUCTION
Congress and the Supreme Court have been significantly at
odds over intellectual property law throughout the early twentyfirst century. This institutional fracture is revealed here in an
original dataset comprising every Supreme Court decision and
statute passed by Congress concerning intellectual property law
from 2002 to 2016. Though the divergence between legislative
and judicial action has largely slipped below the radar, it speaks
volumes about the contemporary political economy of intellectual property law. Analysis of this legal activity also raises questions concerning interbranch separation of powers and majoritarian democracy, questions that spread well beyond intellectual
property.
Recent legislative and judicial actions concerning intellectual property law reveal several stark trends. Congress has been
remarkably hospitable to stronger intellectual property rights.
Congress passed forty-three intellectual property laws during
the time period in question. Of those that affected the substantive strength of intellectual property rights, over 80% made
rights stronger.1 These laws made it easier to acquire intellectual property rights, broadened the scope of protection, and
strengthened enforcement. The Supreme Court’s intellectual
property jurisprudence, however, has moved largely in the opposite direction. The Court decided forty-four intellectual property
cases from the October 2002–2003 Term through the October
2015–2016 Term, and of those that substantively affected the extent of rights, two-thirds weakened protection.

1. The use of the terms “stronger ” and “weaker ” refers solely to the
strength (or weakness) of intellectual property rights from the perspective of
the intellectual property rights owner. These terms do not indicate that a given
law is more or less socially beneficial.
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Differentiating this legislative and judicial action based on
intellectual property subfield exposes additional nuance. While
Congress has tended to strengthen intellectual property protection in patent, copyright, and trademark law, the Supreme Court
has been generally antagonistic toward stronger patent and
trademark rights, but highly receptive to increasing copyright
protection. This differentiation indicates that the Supreme
Court, at least, does not appear to view intellectual property law
as a single, unified field.
Most research to date has focused on the activity of one
branch of government or in a single intellectual property field.
Such approaches miss the insight provided by comparison and
differentiation. The instant dataset provides a richer foundation
for comprehending relations between the branches and across
intellectual property fields, and consequently offers a more robust, empirically supported understanding of governmental intellectual property activity in the modern age. For example, prior
commentators have explained the Supreme Court’s patent decisions as a reaction to concerns about patent trolls and against
the Federal Circuit’s perceived excessive protection for patent
rights. 2 The instant dataset indicates that these explanations
may not tell the full story. Analyzing the pattern of unanimity
in the Court’s intellectual property decisions underscores that
there appears to be something particular about both the patent
and the trademark decisions, a pattern that would not result
from the traditional patent-specific rationales.
Over the period of study, the Supreme Court issued unanimous opinions in intellectual property cases at a rate almost
twice that of its general docket. This difference was not uniform
across intellectual property fields. The Supreme Court issued a
unanimous decision in a remarkable 81% of patent and trademark cases that substantively affected the strength of intellectual property rights. The Court’s rate of unanimity in copyright
cases (14%) and in patent and trademark cases that did not substantively affect the strength of intellectual property rights
(37.5%) were in line with, or below, the Court’s average unanimity rate of about 35% for the rest of its docket during this period. 3
Something has led the Court to reach unanimous agreement in
an overwhelming percentage of substantive patent and trademark decisions, but rarely in nonsubstantive decisions in those
2. See infra Part I.A.1.
3. Cass R. Sunstein, Unanimity and Disagreement on the Supreme Court,
100 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 781 (2015).
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same fields or in copyright cases. As detailed in this Article, the
data reveals several clues concerning what may be causing this
disparity.
The recent actions of Congress and the Supreme Court in
intellectual property law also provide insight into the ideological, political, and sociological influences that drive legal decisionmaking in these branches of government. While legislator ideology and constituent interest do not predict congressional intellectual property activity, special interest group influence has
greater explanatory power. Similarly, judicial ideology does not
appear to drive intellectual property decisions at the Supreme
Court, and traditionally conceived legal reasoning does not fare
much better. Counterintuitively, popular opinion appears to play
a previously unappreciated role in influencing the Supreme
Court’s intellectual property jurisprudence. The direction of the
potential causal relationship between popular opinion and Supreme Court’s intellectual property decisions is not entirely
clear, but evidence from this study indicates that it is the result
of the Justices being a part and parcel of the social dynamics of
their lives, as opposed to intentionally shaping their jurisprudence to satisfy popular preferences.4
Intellectual property decision-making during this time period thus seems to contradict the conventional view of the appropriate roles of the branches of government in the United States.
The Supreme Court, often perceived as the least democratically
accountable branch, appears to be significantly affected by popular opinion on intellectual property rights. Congress, the
branch of government theoretically most responsive to popular
will, has displayed clear countermajoritarian tendencies.
These discrepancies have meaningful consequences for legal
efficiency, majoritarian democracy, and the development of intellectual property law. Having two branches of government
working at cross purposes can be an inefficient use of scarce government resources. Even more problematic, though the analysis
suggests that the Supreme Court may step in to fill some of the
gaps created by Congress’s failure to represent popular will, this
gap-filling does not necessarily satisfy democratic principles.
The Supreme Court can produce majoritarian outcomes, but it
does not do so through majoritarian processes. This difference
between means and ends should not be taken lightly. When the
4. See generally Craig Green, Turning the Kaleidoscope: Toward a Theory
of Interpreting Precedents, 94 N.C. L. REV. 379 (2016) (discussing how social
context can affect how a court’s opinion is interpreted).
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Court cedes to popular will, it may be abdicating its constitutional role of checking Congress and the President. This is a challenge for our constitutional system as it means that no branch is
guarding against the potential tyranny of the majority. Such
concerns may be less of an issue in intellectual property law than
in fundamental rights cases, but the intellectual property cases
analyzed here provide fresh evidence that this concern is a real
one.
This Article progresses in three parts. Part I develops and
analyzes the Supreme Court and congressional legislation dataset. Every Supreme Court decision and every act of legislation
by Congress concerning intellectual property law from 2002 to
2016 was coded by multiple independent analysts to classify it
as strengthening, weakening, or being neutral with respect to
intellectual property rights. Analysis of these data reveal that
Congress has uniformly strengthened rights while the Supreme
Court has primarily weakened them. Part II examines the reasons for this structure of intellectual property decision-making,
and uncovers a somewhat puzzling result: the Supreme Court
appears more responsive than Congress to popular opinion concerning intellectual property rights. Part III explores the implications of these results for the future of intellectual property law
and its ability to serve desired objectives. The findings have significant implications beyond intellectual property law for the
balance of power between the Legislative and Judicial Branches,
and for how democracy functions in the United States.
I. SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESSIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ACTIVITY
Though prior scholarship has examined congressional or judicial treatment of particular intellectual property domains individually, little attention has been paid to each branch’s approach to intellectual property law globally. 5 The data analysis
described in detail below indicates that there was a turning point
in the Supreme Court’s intellectual property jurisprudence beginning with the October 2002 Term.6 This turning point is
marked both by the degree of attention that the Court directed
5. But see Matthew Sag et al., Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual
Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 801, 829–51 (2009) (reporting
an empirical study of all Supreme Court intellectual property cases from 1954
to 2006, and commenting on the dearth of scholarship across intellectual property domains).
6. See infra Part I.A.
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towards intellectual property cases and by the substance of the
Court’s decisions in such cases. For this reason, the present
study focuses on comparing the Supreme Court’s and Congress’s
intellectual property activity from July 1, 2002 to the present.
The time period covered in this study was thus intentionally selected to investigate the recent interbranch intellectual property
dissensus.
I constructed a database of every Supreme Court opinion implicating patent, copyright, trademark, or trade secret issues
from July 1, 2002 through June 30, 2016. The database entries
are the Supreme Court’s final decision in each matter; certiorari
dispositions are not included. I removed from the database any
cases that, though referring to intellectual property law, did not
actually decide any intellectual property issue. For example, Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc. concerned
whether there should be a presumption of market power under
antitrust law where the product in question is subject to patent
protection. 7 Though this case bears a relation to patent protection, its result did not turn on or affect patent law. The final Supreme Court database includes forty-four intellectual property
decisions and is summarized in Appendix A.
Using similar methods, I developed a database of every federal statute concerning patent, copyright, trademark, or trade
secret rights during the same time period. As with the Supreme
Court data, I removed statutes that did not actually affect patent, copyright, trademark, or trade secret doctrine. For example, the Lanham Act is the primary statute providing for Federal
trademark protection in the United States.8 Portions of the Lanham Act regulate nontrademark activities, such as false advertising. 9 Legislation that affected only the false advertising portions of the Lanham Act was excluded from the database. The
final dataset includes forty-three legislative entries for the pertinent period and is summarized in Appendix B. 10 The following
sections analyze the contours of intellectual property activity in
these Supreme Court and congressional datasets.

7. 547 U.S. 28, 28–29 (2006).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2012).
9. Id. § 1125.
10. As discussed below, these forty-three entries derive from thirty-four
acts, some of which affected multiple areas of intellectual property law. See infra Part I.B.
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A. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The primary variable for analysis is whether a given Supreme Court decision or legislative action strengthened or weakened intellectual property protection. Consistent with prior research in this context, strengthened versus weakened refers to
the extent of protection afforded to the intellectual property
rights owner. 11 Accordingly, Supreme Court decisions that make
it easier to acquire intellectual property rights; broaden the
scope of intellectual property protection; make it easier to prove
infringement; or strengthen remedies for infringement are all
considered to strengthen intellectual property protection. Decisions that have the opposite effects weaken protection.12
A number of the Supreme Court decisions are neutral in this
regard. Neutral coding can occur for multiple reasons, such as
procedural decisions that affect both intellectual property owners and opposing parties in equivalent manners, or decisions
that regulate ownership among competing claimants. An example of the former type of neutral decision is Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. 13 This case clarified the proper
standard of appellate review for a district court’s factual findings
made in patent claim construction. 14 The Court held that the
standard of review is clear error, 15 a decision that neither
strengthened nor weakened intellectual property owner rights
11. See Sag et al., supra note 5, at 828 (coding Supreme Court intellectual
property cases based on whether the case was decided in favor of the party asserting the intellectual property right for a study of Justice ideology in intellectual property decisions).
12. Consistent with the standard approach applied in analyzing the ideological direction of Supreme Court decisions, whether a given decision strengthened or weakened intellectual property rights was determined based on the net
effect on intellectual property law with respect to the issue at hand, not based
simply on whether there was a change from the status quo. See, e.g., Lee Epstein
& Andrew D. Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263, 272 (2010) (applying this methodology to code decisions as liberal versus conservative); Isaac
Unah et al., U.S. Supreme Court Justices and Public Mood, 30 J.L. & POL. 293,
307–10 (2015) (same); The Supreme Court Database, WASH. U. L. SCH., supremecourtdatabase.org (last visited Nov. 5, 2017) (same). Thus, Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), is coded as strengthening intellectual property rights
because it upheld the Copyright Term Extension Act against a constitutional
challenge. As the statutory name implies, the Copyright Term Extension Act
extended owner ’s copyright terms. Though upholding the law effectively maintained the status quo, the Court’s decision on the issue before it favored greater
protection.
13. 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015).
14. Id. at 835.
15. Id. at 832.

810

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:803

because sometimes district courts construe patent claims in favor of patentees and other times in favor of alleged infringers.16
Decisions that neither strengthened nor weakened intellectual
property rights were classified as neutral.
Three analysts applied this methodology to independently
code each Supreme Court intellectual property decision. There
was full coder agreement on approximately 90% of the cases.
Where there was not agreement, the coders met for discussion
and were able to reach a unanimous agreement in each case.
Overall, the data appears to indicate a Supreme Court that
is hostile to intellectual property rights. Of the thirty-four decisions that impacted the substantive strength of intellectual
property rights, nearly two-thirds (twenty-two decisions) weakened intellectual property protection.17 There is only a 6% likelihood of such a disparity arising by chance, assuming equal odds
of the Court deciding each case either way. 18 Whether the Supreme Court is selecting cases to weaken rights via the certiorari
process ex ante or reaching decisions that weaken protection ex
post, the result on intellectual property law is the same.
This rough quantitative picture tells only part of the story.
The many cases that weaken protection might affect intellectual
property rights in minor ways, while the few cases that
strengthen rights could have a far greater substantive effect.
Consequently, the cases need to be analyzed qualitatively as well
as quantitatively. In addition, these global statistics conceal significant variation in how the Supreme Court treated different
types of intellectual property protection during the period under
study. Therefore, the following sections divide and analyze the

16. In a similar vein, Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc. concerned whether an employee of a
university receiving government funding could assign the rights in an invention
to a third party without the university’s consent. 563 U.S. 776, 776–79 (2011).
Whether the employee or the university prevailed, the substance and scope of
the owner ’s patent rights would be the same; the case was simply a debate
among competing owners. Id. at 783.
17. The remaining ten cases were determined to be neutral with respect to
affecting the strength of protection.
18. This statistic is the likelihood of the Supreme Court reaching decisions
that weaken intellectual property rights in at least twenty-two out of thirty-four
cases, assuming a 50% likelihood of each decision weakening rights. The formula for this calculation is (m + n)!/(m! x n!) x .5m x .5n, where m is the number
of decisions weakening rights and n is the number of decisions strengthening
rights. See WOLFRAMALPHA, https://www.wolframalpha.com (last visited Nov.
5, 2017) (providing the mathematical formula for such analysis).
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Supreme Court’s decisions by intellectual property subject matter. 19
1. The Patent Cases

The Supreme Court’s twenty-first-century patent jurisprudence has been remarkable, both for the quantity of cases that
the Court decided and for the highly consistent nature of those
decisions. Over the fifty years from 1952 (when the Patent Act
was substantially revised) through 2002 (the start of the present
study), the Supreme Court heard an average of less than one patent law case per year.20 In the past decade, the Court has heard
nearly thirty patent cases, 21 almost triple the rate of the previous half-century. For a Supreme Court that hears fewer than
ninety cases per year, 22 averaging three patent cases annually is
a significant caseload in a single, highly particularized area of
the law.
Not only has the Supreme Court recently heard a large number of patent cases, but the Court has predominantly reached
holdings that weaken patent owners’ rights. Twenty-three of the
Supreme Court’s twenty-nine patent cases during this time substantively affected patentee rights in a measurable direction. 23

19. There is no section on trade secret law as the Supreme Court did not
decide any trade secret cases during this period. The Supreme Court decided
one case that tangentially involved trade secret rights, but did not implicate
trade secret law. See generally Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (concerning the preclusive effects of a federal-court judgment in a case that arose out of
a challenge to the Federal Aviation Administration’s denial of a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request based on FOIA’s trade secret exemption).
20. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme
Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 275, 294 (2002) (explaining
that during the mid-twentieth century the Supreme Court “seemed to lose interest in” patent cases, and that “[f ]or the next three decades, the Court averaged barely one patent decision per year ”); Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the
Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 ILL. L. REV. 387, 387–88 (2001) (referring to the Supreme Court as having rendered itself “nigh invisible” in patent
law from 1982 to 2001, having decided only three substantive patent cases during this period); Supreme Court Patent Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION, https://
writtendescription.blogspot.com/p/patents-scotus.html (last visited Nov. 5,
2017) (listing cases, not all of which are “patent” cases under the pertinent definition here, such as those in which no patent issues were decided).
21. The Court decided twenty-eight patent cases from the October 2006
through October 2015 Terms. See infra App. A.
22. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 95 (12th ed. 2016); see also The
Justices’ Caseload, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, http://www
.supremecourt.gov/about/justicecaseload.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
23. The remaining patent cases were procedural decisions that did not
strengthen or weaken patent rights, disputes concerning patent ownership as
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Of these twenty-three cases, eighteen (78%) weakened patent
protection. These cases were not focused on obscure or minor attributes of patent law, but often went to the heart of patentability and patent protection. As one measure of impact, the five
most cited Supreme Court patent cases of the time period all
weakened owner rights. 24
Several of the Supreme Court’s most heavily cited patent
decisions concerned patent-eligible subject matter. Patent-eligible subject matter doctrine limits the types of innovation that
may qualify for protection under the Patent Act. In a series of
four cases over four years, the Court narrowed the scope of patent-eligible subject matter. These cases held that patent applications on methods of hedging losses,25 methods for exchanging
among competing entities without effect on the strength of the rights, or decisions that modified patent standards in a way that appears indeterminate as to
whether it strengthens or weakens patent protection. See, e.g., Highmark, Inc.
v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744, 1746 (2014) (holding that
trial court decisions to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party
are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S.
251, 251–52 (2013) (holding that state courts may have subject matter jurisdiction over a claim of legal malpractice arising from the handling of a patent case);
Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc.,
563 U.S. 776, 777 (2011) (holding that a university employee receiving government funding may be able to assign the patent rights without the university’s
consent, in spite of the Bayh-Dole Act); Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB
S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 768 (2011) (permitting “willful blindness” to satisfy the
knowledge requirement of induced infringement, but rejecting negligence in
general); Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 394–95
(2006) (holding that a party’s failure to move for a new trial or judgment as a
matter of law after an unfavorable jury verdict prevents the party from seeking
a new trial on appeal on the basis of insufficient evidence).
24. This analysis is based on Westlaw’s citation tool, which includes citations in cases, court documents, administrative filings, and secondary sources,
all as of December 31, 2016. The five most cited patent cases, with citation statistics rounded to the nearest hundred, are: KSR International Co. v. Teleflex,
Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (57,300 citations); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,
547 U.S. 388 (2006) (12,300 citations); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549
U.S. 118 (2007) (8700 citations); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (7000
citations); and Mayo Collaborative Services. v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,
566 U.S. 66 (2012) (5400 citations). Total citation counts can obscure prominence because cases decided longer ago may have more citations due to longevity rather than importance. To control for time since decision, we also examined
citation counts based on citations within three years of a given decision. This
top-five list is not substantially different, and all cases weaken patent protection: KSR, 550 U.S. 398 (31,100 citations); Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (5900 citations); Mayo, 566 U.S. 66 (4800 citations); MedImmune, 549 U.S. 118 (3600 citations); and eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (3600
citations).
25. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593, 611–12 (holding that a patent application on
methods of hedging losses is an abstract idea and not patent eligible).
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financial obligations, 26 processes for determining how much of a
drug to administer,27 and isolated and purified DNA sequences 28
were all ineligible subject matter. Each of these patent applications was rejected under Supreme Court doctrine prohibiting the
patenting of “laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas.” 29 Though this doctrine has been around for decades, the
Supreme Court substantially reinvigorated and strengthened its
application in these cases. 30 Prior to these decisions, the Court
had not denied subject-matter eligibility in over thirty years. 31
As a result of this series of cases, the Court has reduced the patent eligibility of a variety of software and biotechnology product
and process innovations.32

26. Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356 (holding that a patent application on methods
for exchanging financial obligations is ineligible subject matter because the concept of intermediated settlement is an abstract idea).
27. Mayo, 566 U.S. at 67–69 (holding that a process for determining how
much of a drug to administer is ineligible subject matter because the claims are
ineligible laws of nature).
28. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107,
2109 (2013) (holding that isolated and purified DNA sequences are ineligible
subject matter because they are a naturally occurring product of nature, but
that synthetically created cDNA is patent eligible).
29. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
30. John M. Golden, Flook Says One Thing, Diehr Says Another: A Need for
Housecleaning in the Law of Patentable Subject Matter, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1765, 1767–69 (2014); Christopher M. Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad:
A Reinvigorated Judicial Wildcard of Uncertain Effect, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1796, 1808 (2014).
31. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 584 (1978) (holding that a “method
for updating alarm limits during catalytic conversion processes” is not subject
matter eligible).
32. Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs., Inc., 811 F.3d 1314,
1322 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp.
v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) gave “renewed vigor ” to arguments
against the patent eligibility of computer-implemented process inventions); Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, L.L.C., 772 F.3d 709, 716–17 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (reversing
an earlier subject matter decision to hold computer-implemented advertising
inventions ineligible in light of Alice); Tamsen Valoir, Who Will Finance Drug
Development if Natural Products Are No Longer Patentable?, 28 INTELL. PROP.
& TECH. L.J. 3, 4–7 (2016) (stating concern that Myriad and Mayo will make it
harder to obtain drug patents in the United States); Daniel K. Yarbrough, Note,
After Myriad: Reconsidering the Incentives for Innovation in the Biotech Industry, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 141, 141–55 (2014) (discussing how
Mayo, Myriad, and Alice make it harder to get patents in the biotechnology industry).
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The Supreme Court made it more difficult to acquire and
enforce patents in other ways as well. In two of the most significant patent decisions during the period of study, 33 the Court
raised the creativity threshold for acquiring a patent and weakened remedies for patent infringement. The central requirement
for obtaining a patent is that an invention be nonobvious. 34 A
patent applicant must demonstrate that the invention would not
have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art at
the time the patent application was filed. 35 In KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc., the Court made it harder to establish nonobviousness by expanding the scope of subject matter that is considered
obvious in light of existing technology. 36 Subsequent to KSR,
both the courts and the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) have
been more likely to deny patent protection for an invention by
holding that it is obvious. 37
Similarly, in the context of patent enforcement, eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C. reversed a century of common patent
practice in holding that injunctions should not routinely issue
33. These are the two most cited patent decisions of the time period. See
cases cited supra note 24; see also Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Patent Law and
the Sociology of Innovation, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 813, 823 (noting that the “KSR
decision has been hailed as the ‘most significant patent case in at least a quarter
century’” (quoting John F. Duffy, KSR v. Teleflex: Predictable Reform of Patent
Substance and Procedure in the Judiciary, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 34, 34 (2007), http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi/vol106/iss1/24)).
34. NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY
2:101 (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980); Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions
Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1393 (2006).
35. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
36. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
37. Gregory N. Mandel, A Nonobvious Comparison: Nonobviousness Decisions at the PTAB and in the Federal Courts, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 403,
428–29 (2016) (collecting studies that demonstrate this differential); Ali Mojibi,
An Empirical Study of the Effect of KSR v. Teleflex on the Federal Circuit’s Patent Validity Jurisprudence, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 559, 581 (2010) (reporting
empirical analysis of nonobviousness decisions which demonstrates that “both
the Federal Circuit and District court cases reveal that the courts are more
likely to find patents invalid for obviousness as a result of KSR ”); Jason
Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical
Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 732 (2013) (reporting results of an empirical
study finding that “[s]ince KSR, patentees and applicants have been less successful on the issue of obviousness”); see also Janice M. Mueller, Chemicals,
Combinations, and “Common Sense”: How the Supreme Court’s KSR Decision Is
Changing Federal Circuit Obviousness Determinations in Pharmaceutical and
Biotechnology Cases, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 281, 308 (2008) (“After KSR, it is unquestionably easier to establish a prima facie case of obviousness in the chemical arts.”).
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based on a finding of patent infringement.38 Rather, federal
courts are now directed to weigh the more general four-factor
test to determine whether an injunction should apply.39 Prior to
eBay, prevailing patentees obtained injunctions in nearly every
case in which they proved infringement. 40 Subsequent to eBay,
approximately 27% of infringement verdicts have resulted in
damages rewards without an injunction, thereby weakening patent protection. 41
The Supreme Court did support stronger patent rights in
five cases over the pertinent period. Four of these cases, however, concerned narrow issues of relatively minor consequence.
In Bowman v. Monsanto Co., the Court held that the patent exhaustion doctrine did not permit a farmer to copy patented soybean seeds through reproductive planting and harvesting. 42 This
result had appeared straightforward to most patent practitioners and experts. 43 Second, Kappos v. Hyatt concerned the extent
of a patent applicant’s ability to introduce new evidence, beyond
that submitted to the PTO, in district court proceedings challenging the PTO’s denial of a patent application. 44 The Court
held that patentees were not limited in this regard. 45 Patent applicants, however, rarely challenge PTO denials in district
court. 46 Third, in Commil USA, L.L.C. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., the

38. 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006).
39. Id.
40. Ryan T. Holte, The Misinterpretation of eBay v. MercExchange and
Why: An Analysis of the Case History, Precedent, and Parties, 18 CHAP. L. REV.
677, 682 (2015).
41. Id. (stating that “injunction grants have gone from pre-eBay rates of
94%–100% to post-eBay rates of 73% for all patent owners and 16% for patentees that do not practice the patents they own.”); Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An Empirical Study, 101
IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1982–83 (2016) (reporting that from 2006–2013 injunctions
were granted 72.5% of the time).
42. 569 U.S. 278, 281–88 (2013).
43. Li Guo, Self-Replicating Technologies: Do They Exhaust Patent Rights?,
18 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 197, 222–23 (2013); Robert M. Masters et al., Intellectual
Property Outlook: Cases and Trends to Follow in 2013, MONDAQ, http://www
.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/221790/Trademark/Intellectual+Property+
Outlook+Cases+And+Trends+To+Follow+In+2013 (last updated Feb. 14, 2013);
see also Gregory N. Mandel, The Future of Biotechnology Litigation and Adjudication, 23 PACE ENVT’L. L. REV. 83 (2006) (discussing patent infringement
with respect to genetically modified seed).
44. 566 U.S. 431, 433–34 (2012).
45. Id. at 438–39.
46. Mandel, supra note 37, at 420 n.91.
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Court concluded that an infringer’s subjective belief that a patent is invalid is not a defense to an allegation of induced infringement,47 an issue that arises relatively infrequently. Last,
Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Electronics, Inc. held that enhanced damages for willful infringement are available for “egregious” activity “beyond typical infringement,” a result that harmonized this standard with Supreme Court decisions concerning
the award of attorney’s fees in patent litigation. 48
The most significant case in which the Supreme Court supported stronger patent rights is Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership,49 which concerned the statutory presumption of validity
of an issued patent.50 Long-standing precedent held that in order
to overcome this presumption of validity, a party challenging a
patent must prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. 51
Microsoft Corp. involved an accused infringer’s argument that,
at least in certain circumstances, establishing invalidity should
only require a preponderance of the evidence.52 The Supreme
Court upheld the clear and convincing evidence standard. 53

47. 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928–30 (2015).
48. 136 S. Ct. 1923, 1935 (2016). None of the preceding four cases has been
cited more than 650 times (either in total or within three years of decision), in
each case less than one-fifth as often as the heavily cited patent cases discussed
earlier. See cases cited supra note 24. The latter two were decided relatively
recently, so their citation counts may change. Commil USA, L.L.C. v. Cisco Sys.,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015), in particular, represents an area the Court has paid
significant attention to recently. Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s
Quiet Revolution in Induced Patent Infringement, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1007,
1008, 1025 (2016).
49. 564 U.S. 91 (2011). Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership is the ninth
most-cited patent decision of the period (4200 citations), and eighth most cited
within three years of decision (2700 citations).
50. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012); Microsoft Corp., 564 U.S. at 100.
51. Microsoft Corp., 564 U.S. at 97–98.
52. Id. at 99.
53. Id. at 95. That said, experimental evidence suggests that the standard
of proof does not significantly influence the outcome of cases. Dorothy K. Kagehiro & W. Clark Stanton, Legal vs. Quantified Definitions of Standards of Proof,
9 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 163–73 (1985) (discussing an empirical study finding
that different standards of proof produced similar jury verdicts); Mandel, supra
note 34, at 1437–38 (discussing the presumption of validity and standard of
proof in patent law). But see Kevin M. Clermont, Procedure’s Magical Number
Three: Psychological Bases for Standards of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1115,
1148 (1987) (arguing that each common standard of proof has a distinct psychological meaning).
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On balance, the modern Supreme Court has repeatedly
demonstrated a penchant for weakening patent protection. 54
This trend in patent decisions presents a significant departure
from the Supreme Court’s prior patent jurisprudence. A study of
Supreme Court intellectual property cases from 1954 to 2006
found that the Court was more likely to reach holdings in favor
of the intellectual property owner in patent cases. 55 As the Supreme Court did not decide any patent cases from 2002 to 2005, 56
the combined results indicate that the Supreme Court favored
stronger patent rights for the half-century prior to the present
study, but has been weakening patent protection subsequently.
This shift appears to have been relatively abrupt; the Supreme
Court held in favor of strengthening patent protection in all but
one of the substantive patent law cases decided in the five years
preceding the 2002 Term. 57
Prior commentators have focused on patent-specific explanations for the Supreme Court’s recent patent jurisprudence,

54. See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 45–
46 (2010) (discussing how recent Supreme Court decisions have “clearly operated to narrow substantive patent rights”); Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1413, 1422 (2016) (stating that recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence has “reined in patent rights”); Robert J. Rando,
America’s Need for Strong, Stable and Sound Intellectual Property Protection
and Policies: Why It Really Matters, FED. LAW., June 2016, at 12–13 (explaining
that the Supreme Court’s activity in patent cases is viewed by some “as a counter-balance to the perceived Federal Circuit’s pro-patent . . . decisions”).
55. Sag et al., supra note 5, at 841. As discussed below, this study found the
same results for copyright and trademark cases as well. Id.
56. See infra App. A.
57. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S.
722, 724–25 (2002) (holding that prosecution-history estoppel creates a rebuttable presumption against infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, not
an absolute bar); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S.
124, 145 (2001) (holding that plant breeds are utility patent-eligible subject
matter); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28–30
(1997) (affirming the existence of doctrine of equivalents infringement of patent
rights). Contra Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (holding
that the on-sale period that can bar a patent can be triggered before an invention is reduced to practice). In addition, the Court decided a number of patent
cases with a “neutral” effect during this period. See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado
Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829 (2002) (holding that the Federal
Circuit lacks jurisdiction in cases in which patent law is only raised in a counterclaim); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527
U.S. 666, 691 (1999) (holding that state sovereign immunity rights supersede
patent infringement claims); Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162 (1999) (holding that the Administrative Procedure Act’s “substantial evidence” standard applies to federal court review of PTO fact-finding).
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such as the Court reacting against the Federal Circuit expanding patent protection 58 or responding to concerns about patent
trolls. 59 Though these rationales may explain some of the case
outcomes, several aspects of the dataset indicate that there are
broader influences that have not been previously identified. A
first piece of evidence from the data is that the Supreme Court’s
recent tendency towards weakening protection has manifested
itself in trademark law as well, subject matter that does not implicate patent troll concerns and which (in these cases) did not
arise out of the Federal Circuit. 60
2. The Trademark Cases

Although the Supreme Court has heard only six trademark
cases over the past fourteen years, the arc of these decisions is
similar to the patent cases.61 Of the four Supreme Court decisions that affected substantive trademark rights, three of them

58. John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator ”: A Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 671
(2009); Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent
Law, 3 IP THEORY 62, 72–77 (2013); Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures,
supra note 54, at 44.
59. See J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1104
(2014); Dan L. Burk, On the Sociology of Patenting, 101 MINN. L. REV. 421, 446
(2016); Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 54, at 44. “Patent
trolls” is a pejorative term used to refer to a very hard-to-define class of arguably
problematic patent litigation by nonpracticing entities.
60. The Federal Circuit does not have jurisdiction over trademark infringement cases, but does hear appeals from trademark registration disputes at the
PTO. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2012). None of the Supreme Court’s trademark cases
since 2002 have arisen from the Federal Circuit. See infra App. A.
61. Three other decisions sometimes included in lists of Supreme Court
trademark cases are excluded from the analysis here because, as discussed
above, the Supreme Court decided these cases on the basis of false advertising
and antitrust issues. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014) (holding that a party has standing to maintain a
false advertising claim under the Lanham Act for a commercial injury proximately caused by the defendant’s misrepresentation); POM Wonderful L.L.C. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2234 (2014) (holding that competitors may bring
Lanham Act claims alleging unfair competition from false or misleading product
descriptions on food and beverage labels regulated by the Federal Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)); Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S.
183, 201 (2010) (holding that licensing activities for individual teams’ intellectual property, conducted through a corporation separate from the teams, constituted concerted action that was not categorically beyond the coverage of section
1 of the Sherman Act).
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weakened protection, and these include the decisions that have
been the most precedentially significant.62
The two most prominent trademark cases decided during
this time period were likely Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. 63
and Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.64 In Moseley, Victoria’s Secret sought to enjoin the Moseleys from using
the name “Victor’s Little Secret” for a store selling lingerie and
adult novelty items. 65 Victoria’s Secret argued that the Moseley’s
use of “Victor’s Little Secret” would dilute Victoria’s Secret’s
brand.66 The district court and circuit court held that the two
names were sufficiently similar such that Victor’s Little Secret
would dilute Victoria’s Secret brand through tarnishment.67 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that dilution requires proof of
“actual dilution,” not simply the possibility or probability of dilution.68 This result weakened protection by making dilution
more difficult to prove for trademark owners.69
In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., the
Court prevented Fox from asserting trademark rights in a television series whose copyright protection had lapsed. 70 Fox owned
62. The most cited trademark cases of the time period according to
Westlaw’s citation tool, as of December 31, 2016, are Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003), and Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,
Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003), both in total citations (4400 citations and 2500 citations, respectively) and in citations within three years of decision (1100 citations
and 1000 citations, respectively). See also Tom W. Bell, Misunderestimating
Dastar: How the Supreme Court Unwittingly Revolutionized Copyright Preemption, 65 MD. L. REV. 206, 226 (2006) (discussing the import of Dastar); Krista F.
Holt & Scot A. Duvall, Chasing Moseley’s Ghost: Dilution Surveys Under the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1311, 1311 (2008) (stating that Moseley was a landmark decision); Greg Lastowka, Trademark’s Daemons, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 779, 811 (2011) (noting that Moseley is one of the most
prominent examples of trademark dilution law). Two of the Supreme Court
trademark decisions concerned procedural issues that did not strengthen or
weaken substantive trademark protection. B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1305 (2015) (holding that trademark issues adjudicated by the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board preclude a party from arguing
the same issues before a district court); Hana Fin., Inc. v. Hana Bank, 135 S.
Ct. 907, 911 (2015) (holding that whether two trademarks can be tacked for
priority purposes is a question of fact for the jury).
63. 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
64. 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
65. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 418.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 425.
68. Id. at 433.
69. Id. at 434. This holding would be quickly reversed by Congress. See infra Part I.B.1.
70. 539 U.S. 23, 23–24 (2003).
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the copyright to Dwight D. Eisenhower’s book Crusade in Europe
and to a derivative television series of the same name. 71 The copyright on the book was renewed, but the copyright on the television series was not and lapsed in 1977.72 Dastar purchased copies of the television series, edited them, repackaged them, and
sold them under the title World War II Campaigns in Europe.
Unable to state a copyright claim against Dastar’s work because
the television series had entered the public domain, Fox argued
that Dastar’s work violated Fox’s trademark rights because
Dastar was passing off the work of others as its own. 73 The Supreme Court unanimously held that once a work enters the public domain anyone can use it, with or without attribution to the
author, and that trademark law cannot be used to make an end
run around lapsed copyright protection. 74
The Court also weakened trademark owner rights in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., holding that
asserting a fair-use defense in trademark infringement litigation
did not place the burden of negating any likelihood of confusion
on the defendant.75 The sole trademark case of the period of
study in which the Supreme Court strengthened owner rights
was Already, L.L.C. v. Nike, Inc., in which the Court held that a
trademark owner’s covenant not to sue a defendant deprived the
Court of Article III jurisdiction over the defendant’s action to invalidate the trademark. 76
Though the decisions are relatively few in number, the modern Supreme Court has demonstrated a proclivity for weakening
trademark protection. As with patent law, this trend is contrary
to how the Supreme Court had decided trademark cases for the
half-century prior to the present study. 77
3. The Copyright Cases
In contrast to the patent and trademark decisions, the Supreme Court has been highly receptive to copyright owners’
claims over the past fourteen years. The Court has decided nine
copyright cases in this time, strengthening protection in six of
them and reaching neutral conclusions in two others. All four of
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 37–38.
543 U.S. 111, 124 (2004).
568 U.S. 85, 85–86 (2013).
Sag et al., supra note 5, at 841.
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the Court’s most cited copyright decisions reinforced protection.78 This penchant for strengthening copyright protection is
consistent with the Court’s prior copyright jurisprudence. 79
The landmark copyright decision of the period is likely Eldred v. Ashcroft, which upheld the Copyright Term Extension
Act against challenges based on both the Intellectual Property
Clause and the First Amendment of the Constitution. 80 The challengers claimed that the Act’s extension of already existing copyright terms exceeded Congress’s power under the Intellectual
Property Clause, which authorizes copyrights “for limited
Times” in order to “promote the Progress” of “Science and the
useful Arts.” 81 The Court held that such an extension was within
Congress’s authority. 82 In concert with Eldred, the Supreme
Court held in Golan v. Holder that Congress did not violate the
Intellectual Property Clause by restoring copyright protection to
certain foreign works that were previously in the public domain. 83
The Supreme Court issued a number of other decisions during this period that supported stronger copyright owner rights.
For example, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd. concerned the potential liability of peer-to-peer Internet
file-sharing companies for copyright infringing activity by their
users. 84 The plaintiffs were a consortium of twenty-eight large
entertainment companies. The Court held that an entity that
distributes “a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright . . . is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.” 85 The decision was a substantial victory
for the entertainment companies, and led to the shutdown of the
Grokster website. 86
78. The most cited copyright cases, with both total and three-year citation
data as of December 31, 2016, are: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (6200 citations total; 1700 at three years); Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (3500 citations total; 1000 at three years); Reed
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154 (2010) (3200 citations total; 1900 at
three years); and Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014)
(1100 citations total; 1100 at three years).
79. Sag et al., supra note 5, at 841.
80. 537 U.S. 186, 187–90 (2003).
81. Id. at 193.
82. Id. at 222.
83. 565 U.S. 302, 307–08 (2012).
84. 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
85. Id. at 914.
86. Galen Hancock, Note, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd.: Inducing Infringement and Secondary Copyright Liability, 21 BERKELEY
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The sole copyright decision in the past fourteen years that
limited copyright owners’ protection was Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley
& Sons, Inc. 87 Kirtsaeng involved copyright law’s first sale doctrine, which permits a party to sell a legally acquired copy of a
copyrighted work without violating the copyright owner’s exclusive right to distribute the work. 88 This doctrine allows a person
who buys a physical copy of a book or work of art to resell it without infringing the copyright owner’s right to distribute. 89 The
Court held that the first sale doctrine applies to works that had
been lawfully made or acquired abroad, effectively permitting
the importation of copyrighted works that are legally acquired
outside the United States. 90
In summary, the Supreme Court’s recent intellectual property jurisprudence has been doctrinally divided. This difference
indicates that the Supreme Court does not appear to view intellectual property as a unitary field. 91 The Court has heavily favored intellectual property owners in its copyright cases, while
significantly weakening intellectual property protection in patent and trademark decisions. Each of these trends has been consistent over the time period in question, even as there has been
turnover among five of the nine Supreme Court Justices. 92 Before attempting to explain these trends, the following sections
consider congressional activity during this same period.
TECH. L.J. 189, 189 (2006); GROKSTER, http://www.grokster.com (last visited
Nov. 5, 2017).
87. 568 U.S. 519 (2013).
88. Id. at 1354–55.
89. Shyamkrishna Balganesh & Gideon Parchomovsky, Equity’s Unstated
Domain: The Role of Equity in Shaping Copyright Law, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1859,
1879 (2015).
90. Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 523.
91. Cf. Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual Property, 104 NW. U.
L. REV. 1441, 1442–43 (2010) (suggesting that “patent and copyright law have
more in common” than usually recognized); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742,
1799–1814 (2007) (comparing patent and copyright law from a variety of perspectives).
92. Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. was appointed to the vacancy left by
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist in 2005; Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. was
appointed to the vacancy left by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in 2006; Justice
Sonia Sotomayor was appointed to the vacancy left by David H. Souter in 2009;
Justice Elena Kagan was appointed to the vacancy left by Justice John Paul
Stevens in 2010; and Justice Scalia died in February 2016 and was replaced by
Justice Neil M. Gorsuch in 2017. Justices 1789 to Present, SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx
(last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
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B. CONGRESS
A reality of modern politics is that the United States Congress rarely passes legislation. 93 When Congress does take action in intellectual property law, such legislation since the beginning of the twenty-first century has overwhelmingly tended
to strengthen intellectual property owners’ rights.
Congress enacted thirty-four statutes that modified intellectual property laws in the past fourteen years. Several of these
statutes impacted multiple areas of intellectual property law
(most commonly affecting both patent law and trademark law in
relation to the PTO). Such multi-domain statutes were coded as
multiple entries in the database, yielding a total of forty-three
intellectual property legislative actions.
Utilizing the same methodology described above, 94 three
coders classified each legislative action as strengthening intellectual property rights, weakening intellectual property rights,
or being neutral with respect to such rights. Initial agreement
exceeded 90%, and all discrepancies were resolved by discussion
and research concerning the legislation in question.95 Though
93. Mark A. Graber, Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary Thoughts on
Identifying and Mending a Dysfunctional Constitution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611,
642–43 (2014); Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2217, 2218 (2013); Amanda
Terkel, 112th Congress Set to Become Most Unproductive Since 1940s, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 28, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/28/
congress-unproductive_n_2371387.html. See generally Kenneth A. Shepsle,
Dysfunctional Congress?, 89 B.U. L. REV. 371, 371, 373 (2009) (discussing several aspects of congressional dysfunction).
94. Supra Part I.A.
95. The coders disagreed about how to categorize two of the substantive
legislative acts. The first was the Webcaster Settlement Act of 2008, which permits Internet radio stations and streaming services to negotiate rates directly
with record companies. Pub. L. No. 110-435, 122 Stat. 4974. One coder initially
concluded that this law weakened the rights of sound recording copyright owners because they were no longer bound by the rates established by Copyright
Royalty Judges and could instead negotiate with SoundExchange (statutorily
authorized to represent all sound recording copyright owners). Two coders identified the law as neutral because it simply placed Internet radio stations and
streaming services in the same position as small webcasters had been under the
Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780.
After further research, this law was classified as neutral based on the reasoning
above and because the National Association of Broadcasters, the body representing the sound-recording copyright owners, had negotiated the Small
Webcaster Settlement Act and did not object to the Webcaster Settlement Act
of 2008. Peter DiCola & Matthew Sag, An Information-Gathering Approach to
Copyright Policy, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 173, 235–36 (2012); see also NAB Statement on Senate Passage of Webcaster Settlement Act, NAT’L ASS’N. OF BROADCASTERS (Oct. 1, 2008), http://www.nab.org/documents/newsroom/pressRelease
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certain of the statutes included multiple provisions, each was
considered as a unitary whole for analysis because each statute
is passed as a single legislative act. 96
At first glance, forty-three legislative acts may sound like a
surprisingly high level of activity, but many of these acts were
administrative or procedural in nature, with a neutral effect on
intellectual property rights. Examples include laws concerning
internal organization at the PTO and the Copyright Office, 97
statutes that transferred authority to appoint administrative patent and trademark judges, 98 and laws that extended sunset provisions. 99 Removing these laws from the dataset leaves twenty
.asp?id=1672. The second law that coders initially differed on was the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006. Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Two coders classified this as strengthening trademark protection because the legislation was passed specifically to
overturn the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.,
537 U.S. 418 (2003), to clarify that a trademark owner need only establish a
likelihood of dilution to support a dilution claim. The third coder believed the
statute was indeterminate because, in addition to the strengthening effects already noted, the law also clarifies that trademark dilution only applies to nationally recognized famous marks, not famous marks recognized in a niche market. After further research, the law was classified as strengthening protection
based on Congress’s clear intent in passing the act to strengthen dilution protection in light of Moseley. Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in
Trademarks, 88 N.C. L. REV. 427, 486–87 (2010); Jessica Silbey, The Mythical
Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319, 377–78 (2008).
96. Under this approach the legislative acts, just like the Supreme Court
decisions, are individually of differing import. Though this approach precludes
certain types of statistical analysis, it maintains fidelity to actual legislative
practice and permits the holistic analysis provided here.
97. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 14, 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-274, 126 Stat. 2456 (making administrative and funding revisions to PTO funding requirements to make
all patent fees available for expenses relating to patent processing and to permit
patent and trademark fees to be used interchangeably to cover proportionate
shares of the PTO’s administrative costs); United States Capitol Police Administrative Technical Corrections Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-145, 124 Stat. 49
(authorizing the Director of the PTO to reorganize funds in certain ways and
subject to certain conditions); Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-419, 118 Stat. 2341 (replacing the copyright royalty
arbitration process with three permanent Copyright Royalty Judges appointed
by the Librarian of Congress); An Act to improve the United States Code, Pub.
L. No. 108-178, 117 Stat. 2637 (2003) (codifying certain PTO powers and duties).
98. Act of Aug. 12, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-313, 122 Stat. 3014 (transferring
authority to appoint administrative patent and trademark judges from the Director of the PTO to the Secretary of Commerce).
99. See, e.g., STELA Reauthorization Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-200, 128
Stat. 2059 (reauthorizing the satellite carrier distant broadcast signal license
passed in 2010 for five additional years); Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-175, 124 Stat. 1218 (reauthorizing the satellite carrier distant broadcast signal license passed in 2004 for five additional
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congressional acts of legislation over the past fourteen years that
substantively impacted intellectual property owners’ rights.
Seventeen of these twenty substantive changes to statutory
intellectual property law made intellectual property rights easier to acquire, broader, or stronger. The only two laws that weakened intellectual property rights were of very minor significance.
The final statute was likely the most significant piece of intellectual property legislation during the period, the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, 100 a statute which made a variety of
changes that both strengthened and weakened protection. The
odds of obtaining such lopsided legislative results by chance, assuming equal likelihood of strengthening or weakening protection, are less than 1%. 101
Congressional intellectual property action in the first part
of the twenty-first century has dominantly strengthened intellectual property protection. Unlike contemporary Supreme
Court decisions, Congress’s legislation has been relatively consistent across the intellectual property domains. Nevertheless,
analyzing the statutes by field provides a more nuanced understanding of congressional action, as the following sections detail.
1. Trademark Legislation
Trademark law provides an easy context in which to begin
because all seven of the substantive pieces of trademark legislation during this period strengthened owner rights. The most significant trademark law enacted since 2002 was the Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of 2006.102 This statute overrode the aforementioned Supreme Court decision in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.103 Recall that in Moseley, the Supreme Court weakened protection by holding that trademark owners must prove
years); Temporary Extension Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-144, 124 Stat. 42 (extending through March 28, 2010, the moratorium on copyright liability for certain subscribers of satellite TV by amending the Communications Act of 1934);
Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-447, 118 Stat. 3393 (extending copyright provisions to allow television companies to provide distant network signals to subscribers who cannot receive
broadcast network television signals via over-the-air television antennas).
100. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
101. See WOLFRAMALPHA, supra note 18.
102. Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120
Stat. 1730.
103. Trademark Dilution Revision Act § 2; Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,
Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003); see discussion supra Part I.A.2.
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actual dilution rather than only a likelihood of dilution. 104 The
Trademark Dilution Revision Act provides that likelihood of dilution is the standard for an owner of a famous mark to establish
dilution,105 making it easier for the owners of famous marks to
support a cause of action for dilution. 106
Another significant trademark statute was the Prioritizing
Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of
2008.107 This law prohibited the transshipment or exportation of
counterfeit goods and services as violations of trademark law. 108
The law also amended trademark seizure provisions to broaden
protective order requirements and increased the damages available for the use of counterfeit trademarks. 109 All of these provisions strengthened trademark owners’ rights. The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 similarly
strengthened trademark rights and enforcement in the context
of the import and export of infringing goods.110
The four other trademark laws passed in this period were of
more modest import. The Trademark Technical and Conforming
Amendment Act of 2010 lets trademark owners cure certain registration deficiencies. 111 The Intellectual Property Protection
and Courts Amendments Act of 2004 made it easier for trademark owners to prove willful infringement in relation to domain
names. 112 The 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act implemented the Madrid Protocol, which
enables trademark owners who register with the national office
of one country to have trademarks registered in all participating

104. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433.
105. Trademark Dilution Revision Act § 2.
106. As discussed above, the Trademark Dilution Revision Act also clarified
the meaning of a famous mark, providing that a mark must be recognizable by
a member of the general public to be considered famous. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).
See supra text accompanying note 95.
107. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256.
108. Id. § 205.
109. Id. §§ 102, 104.
110. Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114125, 130 Stat. 122 (2016).
111. Trademark Technical and Conforming Amendment Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-146, 124 Stat. 66.
112. Intellectual Property Protection and Courts Amendments Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-482, §§ 202–03, 118 Stat. 3912, 3916–17.
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countries. 113 And lastly, the Collectible Coin Protection Act enhanced trademark owners’ rights in connection with unauthorized, trademark-infringing collectibles. 114 All seven trademark
statutes that affected substantive rights in the last fourteen
years strengthened trademark protection.
2. Copyright Legislation

Twenty-first-century copyright legislation also has been relatively uniform. Congress passed eight substantive copyright
statutes during this time, and six of these strengthened protection. For example, the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 strengthened copyright protection and enforcement in relation to the import and export of copyright infringing
works. 115 The Family Entertainment and Copyright Act increased copyright infringement penalties to target the unauthorized early release of movies or software and the filming of movies
by audience members in movie theaters.116 The Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of 2008
expanded copyright owners’ rights in several manners, such as
providing a safe harbor for copyright registrations that contain
inaccurate information, allowing courts to impound various records while an infringement action is pending, and deeming unauthorized export (not just import) of phonorecord copies to be
copyright infringement. 117 Other legislation strengthened copyright protection for vessel design, 118 phonorecords,119 and fraudulent online activity. 120
The two copyright statutes that weakened protection did so
in a narrow context: clarifying that particular educational uses
of copyrighted material are exempt from copyright infringement
113. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-273, §§ 13401–03, 116 Stat. 1758, 1913, 1920 (2002).
114. Collectible Coin Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 113-288, 128 Stat. 3281
(2014).
115. Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114125, 130 Stat. 122 (2016).
116. Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9,
119 Stat. 218.
117. Prioritizing Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, §§ 101–02, 105, 122 Stat. 4256, 4257–59.
118. Vessel Hull Design Protection Amendments of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110434, 122 Stat. 4972.
119. Copyright Cleanup, Clarification, and Corrections Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-295, § 5, 124 Stat. 3180, 1381.
120. Fraudulent Online Identity Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 108-482, §§ 201–
05, 118 Stat. 3912, 3916–18.
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liability. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004 (IDEA) establishes that copyright protection
does not bar a publisher of instructional materials used in elementary or secondary schools from creating and distributing certain instructional materials specified by IDEA, as long as they
are used within limitations established under IDEA. 121 Similarly, the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations
Authorization Act extended a copyright liability exemption for
instructional broadcasting for the purpose of digital distance
learning and distance education.122
Overall, Congress has expanded copyright protection across
several domains substantially more than it has limited protection in particularized educational contexts.
3. Trade Secret Legislation
Historically, trade secret law was primarily state law, but
Congress recently enacted the Defend Trade Secrets Act, which
created a private federal cause of action for trade secret misappropriation for the first time. 123 In addition to implementing
standard trade secret protection in federal law, the Act included
a new provision allowing trade secret owners to seek an order ex
parte to seize allegedly stolen trade secret information from a
defendant’s possession “in extraordinary circumstances” to prevent further dissemination. 124
Prior to the Defend Trade Secrets Act, the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 provided certain federal trade secret protections, but limited enforcement authority to the Attorney General. 125 Congress twice previously amended the Economic
Espionage Act during the time period under consideration. The
Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012 expanded the
Economic Espionage Act to prohibit the theft of trade secrets
taken for intended (not just actual) use and broaden the definition of a trade secret under federal law to include information
related to services (not just information related to products). 126
121. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647, 2807–08.
122. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 13301, 116 Stat. 1758, 1910–13 (2002).
123. Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 2(b)(1), 130
Stat. 376, 376 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2012)).
124. Id. § 2(b)(2)(A)(i).
125. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–1839.
126. Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-236,
126 Stat. 1627.
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The Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act
of 2012 increased the fines available as penalties for economic
espionage.127 All three congressional acts concerning trade secret law passed during the period of study strengthened trade
secret protection.
4. Patent Legislation

Congress has passed just three statutes in the last fourteen
years that substantively impact patentee rights. Two of these
strengthened patent protection. The third, the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act (AIA), is the most complex and substantial
intellectual property statute passed since the turn of the century.
The AIA cannot be simply characterized as either strengthening or weakening patent protection because the statute revised the Patent Act in several manners that do not directly interact with each other. Most famously, the AIA shifts the United
States from a first-to-invent patent system (under which the law
generally awarded a patent to the first person to invent an invention) to a first-to-file patent system (under which the law generally awards a patent to the first inventor to file a patent application). 128 These changes in priority generally do not strengthen
or weaken patent protection; they simply determine who among
competing inventors is entitled to a patent. 129 Some commentators perceive this shift as favoring sophisticated, industrial inventors over individual, less well-funded inventors in a race to
the patent office. 130
127. Foreign and Economic Espionage Penalty Enhancement Act of 2012,
Pub. L. No. 112-269, §2(a), 126 Stat. 2442, 2442.
128. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat.
284, 285 (2011); David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple?
The America Invents Act and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REV. 517, 519–
20 (2013); Jason Rantanen, Lee Petherbridge, & Jay P. Kesan, Debate, America
Invents, More or Less?, 160 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 229, 230–31 (2012), http://
scholarship.law.upenn.edu/penn_law_review_online/vol160/iss1/3.
129. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 3; Abrams & Wagner, supra note
128; Mark A. Lemley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules
Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1299, 1313 (2003); Rantanen et al., supra
note 128, at 230.
130. Andrew L. Sharp, Misguided Patent Reform: The Questionable Constitutionality of First-to-File, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1227, 1236 (2013); see also
Abrams & Wagner, supra note 128, at 559 (reporting the results of a study
which indicated “a significant decline in patenting by individual inventors relative to larger entities that is caused by the change in Canadian patent law from
a first-to-invent to first-to-file priority rule”).
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The AIA made several other changes to the Patent Act, some
of which weakened protection. The AIA revised the system for
asking the PTO to reconsider the issuance of a patent in internal
administrative proceedings. 131 These changes generally weaken
patent rights because they create a less-expensive venue in
which third parties can challenge issued patents.132 The AIA also
essentially eliminated patents on methods of reducing or avoiding tax liability and provided certain prior user rights for entities
that had been using an invention for more than a year before
another inventor filed for a patent. 133 Each of these changes limits ownership rights.
Conversely, the AIA strengthened patent protection in certain regards. To obtain a patent an inventor must disclose not
only how to make and use the subject invention, but also the best
mode for practicing the invention. 134 The AIA retains the best
mode requirement in form, but eliminates failure to disclose best
mode as an invalidity defense in infringement litigation, a
change that is decidedly pro-patentee.135 The AIA made additional changes that benefited patent owners, such as proscribing
the ability of private parties to bring false marking lawsuits and
broadening a limitation on the ability of prior work by a research
team to render later innovation by the team obvious due to personnel changes. 136
Overall, the AIA contains many provisions that weaken patent rights and others that strengthen protection. The legislative
history of the act sheds light on the complex, mixed bag nature
of the law. The AIA had a tortuous and heavily negotiated legislative history.137 The first version of the bill that eventually became the AIA was introduced in the House of Representatives in
131. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 6.
132. Robert L. Stoll, Maintaining Post-Grant Review Estoppel in the America
Invents Act Revisited: A Call for Legislative Restraint, 23 FED. CIR. B.J. 15, 16
(2013) (explaining that Congress intended post-grant review to be a “quick and
cost effective alternative to litigation” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at
48 (2011))); Jeff Kettle, Congress Giveth and Taketh Away: A Look at Section 18
of the America Invents Act and the Review of Business Method Patents, 94 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 201, 203 (2012) (explaining that post-grant review was meant to provide a quicker and cheaper avenue to litigation).
133. 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2012); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 14;
35 U.S.C. § 102.
134. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
135. Id. §§ 112(a), 282(b)(3)(a).
136. Id. §§ 102(c), 292.
137. See Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents
Act: Part I of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 435 (2012) [hereinafter Matal, Part I]; see also
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2005.138 A similar bill was introduced in the Senate in 2006. 139
Though committee hearings were held, neither piece of legislation advanced. 140 In 2007, parallel bills were introduced in the
Senate and House that would have significantly weakened patent protection. These bills had strong support in Congress and
from many powerful industry players in the information technology and computer fields. 141 The bills were also highly controversial and encountered significant pushback, generally led by the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors. 142 The alignment of
powerful industries on opposite sides of the patent reform debate
led to a several-year dance in which new bills were introduced in
Congress every year, each successively watered down in an effort
to find common ground. 143
Because a number of the AIA’s provisions have a clear substantive impact on patent law, it would be inappropriate to classify the AIA as neutral with respect to patent rights. But it is
also hard to say that it definitively either strengthens or weakens patent rights overall. Its net impact will only be seen over
time and will depend significantly on how courts interpret its
provisions.
The two other substantive patent laws enacted since 2002
are easier to classify. The Cooperative Research and Technology
Enhancement (CREATE) Act of 2004 amended federal patent
law so that a shift in research team membership would not allow
DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS
CAN SOLVE IT 100–02 (2009). See generally Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative
History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539 (2012)

[hereinafter Matal, Part II] (detailing the legislative history of AIA provisions
that only apply after a patent has been issued).
138. H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (1st sess. 2005); Matal, Part I, supra note 137,
at 438.
139. S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2d sess. 2006); Matal, Part I, supra note 137, at
439.
140. See Matal, Part I, supra note 137, at 438–39.
141. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 137, at 101–02; Jonas Anderson, Congress
as a Catalyst of Patent Reform at the Federal Circuit, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 961,
982–84 (2014); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 449, 469–71 (2010).
142. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 137, at 101–02; Christopher M. Holman,
Biotechnology’s Prescription for Patent Reform, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 318, 318, 325 (2006); Stephen B. Maebius, 2007 Patent Reform Bill:
Will It Benefit Nanotechnology?, 4 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 171, 173–74
(2007).
143. Liza Vertinsky, Comparing Alternative Institutional Paths to Patent Reform, 61 ALA. L. REV. 501, 526–27 (2010); see Matal, Part I, supra note 137, at
439–47.
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an earlier team’s work to render a later team’s work obvious. 144
The goal of the CREATE Act was to promote cooperative research by protecting patent rights for group innovation. 145 The
second law is the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003, which included several modest
changes to the Hatch-Waxman Act provisions of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 146 These revisions require companies seeking to produce a generic version of a patented pharmaceutical to submit more detailed information and to notify the
brand-name patent owner sooner. 147
Two of the three patent laws passed during the period in
question thus strengthened patent rights, and the third made a
number of changes with mixed effects on patent protection.
Across intellectual property law, the twenty substantive laws enacted by Congress over the past fourteen years overwhelmingly
tended to strengthen intellectual property protection. This trend
was true both generally and in each of the intellectual property
domains.
The quantitative and qualitative data analysis provided
here depicts two extremes of Congress–Supreme Court interaction: copyright law, in which the branches are in accord, and patent and trademark law, in which the branches appear deeply
divided. The division in patent and trademark law cannot be dismissed as the Court simply interpreting federal statutes because
a significant number of the decisions that weaken protection involve changes to judge-made law rather than statutory interpretation. 148 In addition, if the Court were simply interpreting statutes in accordance with Congress’s intended meaning, we would
expect a roughly even split between strengthening and weakening decisions. There is no reason to expect that any lack of clarity
144. Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-453, § 2, 118 Stat. 3596, 3596.
145. See id.
146. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066.
147. Id. § 1112. The Act also contains a provision that allows generic version
applicants to make a counterclaim in patent infringement lawsuits to require
patent owners to remove certain inappropriately listed patents from the Orange
Book, a list of patents associated with approved drug products. Id. § 1101. Based
on research, this provision was deemed to be less significant than the patentstrengthening provisions. Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of
the Hatch-Waxman Scheme on Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 233–49 (2005).
148. The four patent eligible subject matter cases provide clear examples, as
do several of the other cases discussed in the text above. See generally App. A.

2017]

INSTITUTIONAL FRACTURE

833

in statutory terms should be biased in one direction, and certainly no reason such a bias would appear in patent and trademark legislation, but not in copyright law.
While Congress spent the first part of the twenty-first century almost exclusively strengthening intellectual property protection, the Supreme Court has been pushing nearly as strongly
in the opposite direction for patent and trademark protection.
The disagreement between these branches of government that
explicitly bubbled to the fore in one trademark case appears to
underscore a far deeper divide. 149 Understanding the reasons for
this interbranch divide is the subject of the next part.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFLUENCES
The stark divergence between the Supreme Court’s and
Congress’s perspectives on intellectual property law raises important questions concerning why these branches of government
appear to view the law through such strikingly different lenses,
and which branch might have the better view of the law. Part II
of this Article seeks to answer the former question, turning to
various models of institutional influence to generate hypotheses
about why the two branches may be behaving in different manners. Part III of the Article tackles the latter, normative question, discussing insights that can be drawn concerning which
branch is more likely to produce socially desirable intellectual
property law and what the institutional fracture means for governmental function more broadly.
A. CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCES
The comparison of intellectual property lawmaking in the
Supreme Court and Congress provides a useful case study on judicial and legislative activity because the divergence presents
clear evidence that the different branches of government are influenced by different mechanisms. The mechanisms that influence Congress and the Supreme Court have been studied by political scientists, legal scholars, and other experts, but it is rarely
possible to draw strong conclusions because most examples concern only one branch and there are always varied causal factors. 150 Governmental decision-making is difficult to parse, and
149. See supra Parts I.A.2, I.B.1 (discussing Congress’s enactment of the
Trademark Dilution Revision Act to override the Supreme Court’s decision in
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418 (2003)).
150. See, e.g., Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov, Lawmakers as Lawbreakers, 52 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 805, 828 (2010); Benjamin G. Bishin, Constituency Influence in
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this Article does not claim to have a definitive answer, but the
existence of different outcomes provides the possibility of being
able to draw causal hypotheses. 151 Section II.A analyzes apparent influences on Congress’s intellectual property decision-making, followed by Section II.B analyzing such influences on the
Supreme Court.152
1. Public Choice

Analyzing legislative influences on intellectual property law
can pick up precisely where the discussion of the data in Part I
left off—with the AIA. As the analysis above described, industry
interests played a significant role in shaping the AIA. 153 Certain
large companies and industry organizations were the primary
drivers who initiated the AIA bills in an effort to weaken patent
protection; conversely, contrary industry entities pushed back
against early versions of the bills in an effort to maintain the
status quo or strengthen patent rights where possible. 154 At first
Congress: Does Subconstituency Matter?, 25 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 389, 404–06 (2000);
Jack Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1531, 1534–35 (2009); Jeffrey A. Segal & Chad Westerland, The Supreme Court, Congress, and Judicial Review, 83 N.C. L. REV.
1323, 1351–52 (2005).
151. Gregory Mitchell, Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientific Dialogue,
83 N.C. L. REV. 167, 199 (2004); see David C. Donald, Law in Regression? Impacts of Quantitative Research on Law and Regulation, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L.
REV. 520, 527 (2015).
152. Both Congress and the Court, of course, are made up of individual members. Any analysis, such as those herein, examining influences on these bodies
necessarily does so in a holistic manner. Just as we speak of the Constitution’s
Framers’ intent in a broad sense, recognizing that it can be formally deconstructed, it is useful to consider what actions and influences appear to be affecting other governmental bodies as a whole, even while realizing that the manner
of influence is complex and actually takes place on an individual level. See, e.g.,
Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme
Court Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1491–92 (2001) (reporting study
results that indicate that “Justices are individual human beings whose particular behavior is not reducible to simple models”); Barry Friedman, The Politics
of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 270–329 (2005) (discussing a variety of
political, individual, and institutional influences on judicial decision-making);
Garrick B. Pursley, Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511, 555, 558–59,
577 (2010) (discussing the interaction between individual legislator motivations
and institutional decision-making in Congress). See generally JACK N. RAKOVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1997) (discussing the difficulty of determining original intent with respect
to the Constitution).
153. See discussion supra Part I.B.4.
154. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 137; Nguyen, supra note 141. See generally
Vertinsky, supra note 143, at 526 (describing industry efforts to influence intellectual property legislation).
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glance it might appear surprising that even though the centerpiece of the AIA—shifting the United States to a first-to-file patent system—was largely uncontroversial, it still took over six
years to pass the legislation.155 In reality, these provisions were
less controversial because this change was viewed by institutional parties on both sides of the debate as benefiting established companies. 156 The wealthy industry leaders who were often in bitter opposition with respect to strengthening or
weakening various patent provisions were unified on a legal
change that was mutually beneficial to established companies at
the potential cost to individual inventors and smaller companies.
The lack of controversy among the major entities concerning
first-to-file highlights that passage of the AIA was guided significantly by established, connected industry interests. This history
is consistent with standard models of public choice theory.157
In their seminal work on legislative decision-making and
public choice, Professors Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey characterize legislative conduct as influenced by constituent interest,
legislator ideology, and special interest groups.158 The relative
weights of these three factors depend on the context and nature
of particular legislation.159 Under an idealized view of Congress’s
role in the federal government, ideology and constituent interest
are valid and appropriate bases for legislative action, while special interest group influences are not necessarily so. Farber and
Frickey reason from this proposition to argue that courts analyzing legislative action should therefore respect legislative policy
decisions, but also attempt “to mitigate undue interest group influence.” 160
Many authors have built upon this work, trying to identify
and evaluate the contexts in which special interest groups hold
the greatest sway. 161 Special interest groups appear to be the
most powerful when trying to influence legislation that benefits
a small, concentrated group, but whose costs or other negative
155. Matal, Part I, supra note 137, at 435–36.
156. See, e.g., Sharp, supra note 130.
157. See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW: READINGS
AND COMMENTARY 3–62 (1997) (collecting a variety of literature concerning
public choice and special interest group influence).
158. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public
Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 900–01 (1987).
159. Id. at 901.
160. Id.
161. See generally STEARNS, supra note 157 (collecting a variety of literature
concerning public choice and special interest group influence).
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effects are widely distributed.162 Special interest groups also appear better able to block detrimental legislation from being enacted than they are at getting beneficial laws passed. 163
This conceptual understanding of public choice theory and
special interest group influence on legislation dovetails quite
strikingly with intellectual property law. Under Farber and
Frickey’s tripartite model of legislator influence, two of the three
prongs would be expected to have relatively minor influence in
most intellectual property contexts. Studies indicate that people
tend not to have strongly-held opinions about intellectual property law and that intellectual property law is not high on most
people’s radar. 164 For these reasons, general constituent pressures and legislator ideology would be expected to produce only
minor influences on legislator preferences concerning intellectual property laws. The legislative history of the AIA appears to
bear this out. While special interest groups were heavily invested in the debates, there was little public interest. 165 The AIA
represents the most significant piece of intellectual property legislation enacted this century. Most other intellectual property
legislation received little to no public attention. The lack of
strongly held ideological positions about intellectual property
law on the part of most legislators, and limited constituent attention, leaves special interest groups to play an outsized role in
intellectual property legislation.
162. Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900–2000, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2187, 2236 (2000); see Vertinsky, supra
note 143, at 527–28; see also Frank B. Cross, Essay, The Judiciary and Public
Choice, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 355, 372 (1999) (“Indeed, there is reason to believe
that special interests are at their most influential when it comes to blocking
beneficial government action (rather than creating undesirable government action).”); Farber & Frickey, supra note 158, at 906 (stating that interest groups
“often exercise more power when they block legislation than when they support
it”).
163. Vertinsky, supra note 143, at 527–28; Cross, supra note 162; see Einer
R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 64 (1991); Peter L. Kahn, The Politics of Unregulation:
Public Choice and Limits on Government, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 280, 284–85
(1990).
164. Gregory N. Mandel et al., Intellectual Property Law’s Plagiarism Fallacy, 2015 BYU L. REV. 915, 951–56 (2015); see also OFFICE FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET, THE EUROPEAN CITIZENS AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: PERCEPTIONS, AWARENESS AND BEHAVIOUR (2013). Intellectual
property attorney opinions differ from lay public opinion. Gregory N. Mandel,
What Is IP for? Experiments in Lay and Expert Perceptions, 90 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 659 (2016).
165. See generally Matal, Part II, supra note 137 (detailing the history of the
AIA).
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Exacerbating this dynamic, many intellectual property laws
concern rights benefiting relatively few, concentrated groups (intellectual property owners) at the expense of diffuse, uncoordinated individuals (intellectual property users). Accordingly, the
political and economic structure of intellectual property law
makes it an area ripe for special interest influence. 166 Even on
matters of limited popular attention and diffuse public interest,
however, Congress is still meant to have the public’s interest in
mind. Low public awareness and knowledge does not mean that
Congress can abdicate its role as the representative of the people; rather, it may be precisely in such circumstances where this
responsibility is greatest. 167
Several authors have specifically identified special interest
rent-seeking as the driving force behind particular intellectual
property legislation, from the movie and music industries to various technological fields. 168 As a result, content and creation industries have often lobbied successfully to expand intellectual
property protection in the copyright, trademark, and patent law
contexts. 169 The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act,
which extended the term of copyright protection prospectively
and retrospectively, has been specifically identified as “a classic
instance of almost pure rent-seeking legislation” resulting from
the asymmetry in lobbying power between special interest intellectual property owners and the diffuse public interest. 170 The
Federal Trademark Dilution Act 171 and the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act 172 also have been identified as specific
166. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 14 (2004); Merges, supra note 162; Viva R.

Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping
Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1496–97 (2004).
167. See generally Andrew W. Neidhardt, The Federalist View of Right-toWork Laws, 18 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 251, 264–65 (2015) (discussing the
role representative groups play in advocating for citizens’ interests in the context of complex legislation); Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1266–71 (2009) (discussing political accountability
in the context of issues where the public is largely uninformed).
168. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Empirical Analysis of the
Patent Court, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 112 (2004); Merges, supra note 162; Moffat,
supra note 166, at 1497. See generally Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 860–61 (1987) (discussing the influence of interest groups on the legislative process).
169. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 166; Merges, supra note 162.
170. Merges, supra note 162, at 2236–37; see also Moffat, supra note 166, at
1497.
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012).
172. Id. § 1125(d).
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instances of trademark owner industry lobbying efforts. 173 Similarly, but in a very different context, the establishment of the
Federal Circuit in 1982 was considered by some to be the result
of successful special interest group efforts. 174
Professors Jay Kesan and Andres Gallo studied the legislative efforts of different industry groups during the AIA legislative process and concluded that industry lobbyists “have a strong
influence on the voting behavior of congresspersons, and they
have a real influence on the direction of patent reform.” 175 Based
on analysis of congressional voting records on an earlier version
of the AIA, the authors found that voting correlated with contributions from various patent law interests and concluded, “Congress does not have a point of view independent from the stakeholders in the patent system. Rather, [voting] . . . reflect[s] the
participation and preferences of major stakeholders, such as the
information technology industry, the pharmaceutical industry,
the law associations, and the manufacturing sector.” 176
These examples appear to confirm the public choice model
and explain why twenty-first-century intellectual property legislation has tended to accommodate owner interests and
strengthen intellectual property rights. That substantive intellectual property legislation was successfully enacted twenty
times in fourteen years is particularly notable, given that Congress passes few laws and that special interest groups are identified as being at their strongest in blocking undesirable legislation.177 In intellectual property law, special interests have been
powerful enough to not only prevent what they view as problematic laws, but to proactively get stronger laws passed.
Intellectual property interests have consistently achieved
this success even as the dominant political parties have shifted
over time. During the first part of the period under study, Re-

173. MALLA POLLACK, CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO TRADEMARK LAW
§ 10:2 (2017) (referring to the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 as largely
being considered a result of lobbying efforts by the International Trademark
Association); Suzanna Sherry, Irresponsibility Breeds Contempt, 6 GREEN BAG
2D 47, 53 (2002) (discussing lobbying efforts of trademark owners leading to the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act).
174. Moffat, supra note 166, at 1498; Landes & Posner, supra note 168.
175. Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, The Political Economy of the Patent
System, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1341, 1385 (2009).
176. Id. at 1413.
177. See Vertinsky, supra note 143 (discussing role of special interest groups
in patent legislation).
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publican George W. Bush was President and Republicans controlled a majority of seats in the House of Representatives and
in the Senate. 178 In a later two-year block during the period,
Democrat Barack Obama was President and Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress. 179 At other times, control of
the Legislative and Executive Branches was split among the parties in various ways. 180 In each of these time periods, Congress
enacted legislation strengthening intellectual property rights.
This fact both demonstrates the strength of special interests in
pursuing intellectual property legislation and underscores the
point that intellectual property tends not to have a strong ideological bearing.
2. Intellectual Property Subfields
Several authors have noted the almost uniform success of
copyright- and trademark-industry lobbying efforts, in contrast
to a more mixed record for patent-industry interests. 181 One explanation for this difference is that copyright- and trademarkindustry actors tend to be more uniform in preferring stronger
intellectual property protection, so there usually is no powerful
industry player to push back. 182
Patent industry interests, on the other hand, are often more
diffuse when it comes to their patent law preferences, which may
partially explain why less patent legislation was passed during
the period of study than copyright and trademark legislation.
While most copyright- and trademark-industry entities benefit
from stronger intellectual property protection in relation to their
consumers, patent practice functions differently.183 Many patent-industry entities both produce intellectual property themselves and also consume other owners’ intellectual property in
178. Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, HISTORY, ART & ARU.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Institution/
Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions (last visited Nov. 5, 2017); Party Division in the
Senate, 1789–Present, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv
.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
179. HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra
note 178; U.S. SENATE, supra note 178.
180. HISTORY, ART & ARCHIVES U.S.HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra
note 178; U.S. SENATE, supra note 178.
181. Litman, supra note 168, at 871; Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A
Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 448 (2002).
182. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 175, at 1413; Litman, supra note 168, at
872–74; Liu, supra note 181.
183. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 175, at 1370.
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order to bring products to market. 184 As a result, patent-industry
entities are more likely to end up on the opposite sides of intellectual property debates, depending on the particular industry
context and whether a specific firm or industry innovates itself
or utilizes the innovation of others. 185 This is what took place
with the debates over the AIA discussed above. 186
All of that being said, the copyright and trademark tide in
Congress may be turning. The Stop Online Piracy Act 187 (SOPA)
and PROTECT IP Act 188 (PIPA) were the House and Senate versions, respectively, of bills designed to thwart the widespread
availability of movies, music, and other media on the Internet in
violation of copyright law. 189 These bills were supported by major media lobbies, including the Motion Picture Association of
America and the Recording Industry Association of America, as
well as by the United States Chamber of Commerce. 190 SOPA
and PIPA would have penalized or prohibited Internet search
engines and web payment sites from providing access or payment to websites that distribute material in violation of federal
copyright laws.191
Initially, SOPA and PIPA had widespread, bipartisan congressional support.192 In December 2011, however, a collection of
technology and Internet companies, including Google, Facebook,
Amazon, and Wikipedia, came out in strong opposition based on
184. Jonathan M. Barnett, Property As Process: How Innovation Markets Select Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 390 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, Ten
Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (And One Not to), 48 B.C. L.
REV. 149, 151 (2007); Gregory N. Mandel, Proxy Signals: Capturing Private Information for Public Benefit, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 36 (2012).
185. Barnett, supra note 184, at 388; Kesan & Gallo, supra note 175, at
1351–53; Mandel, supra note 184, at 24.
186. See supra Part I.B.4.
187. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
188. Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of
Intellectual Property Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011).
189. Michael A. Carrier, SOPA, PIPA, ACTA, TPP: An Alphabet Soup of Innovation-Stifling Copyright Legislation and Agreements, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 21, 21–23 (2013); Yafit Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and Public Choice: From Legislative Battles to Private Ordering, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
203, 220–21 (2013); Sepehr Shahshahani, The Nirvana Fallacy in Fair Use Reform, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 273, 314 (2015).
190. Lev-Aretz, supra note 189, at 244.
191. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. §§ 102(c)(1), (c)(2)(A)(i), (c)(2)(B)–(C)(i), (c)(4)(A)
(1st Sess. 2011); S. 968, 112th Cong. §§ 3(d)(1), (d)(2)(C)–(D), (e)(1) (1st Sess.
2011).
192. Jonathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves Antipiracy Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2012, at B6; Edward Wyatt, Lines Drawn on
Antipiracy Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2011, at B1.
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concerns about Internet censorship and stifling online innovation.193 Congressional leaders were taken aback by the
groundswell of public opposition to SOPA and PIPA, and indefinitely postponed action on the legislation. 194 Though the response against SOPA and PIPA was coordinated by certain concentrated industry interests, it also depended heavily for its
success on the numerous, diffusely affected members of the public that the industry players were able to mobilize. After regularly passing intellectual property legislation in the decade leading up to the SOPA and PIPA debates, the only intellectual
property legislation that Congress has passed subsequently
which strengthened owners’ rights was in the trade secret context.
Empirical evidence, historical analysis, and public choice
theory converge on a relatively convincing argument that
twenty-first-century intellectual property legislation has been
significantly driven by special interest groups. 195 This story appears to track legislative efforts in copyright, trademark, trade
secret, and patent law, in each case leading to legislation with
consistently stronger protection for intellectual property rights.
As noted above, the unidirectional nature of legislative change
in intellectual property law may now be shifting. The AIA debates uncovered widely disparate positions on patent protection
across different industries, and the failure of SOPA and PIPA
speaks to the rise of other industry players who are pressing
against certain copyright expansions. Even with this transformation, congressional legislative activity on intellectual property still appears largely driven by special interest efforts; these
interests, however, may be less uniform in their preferences than
they were previously.
B. SUPREME COURT INFLUENCES
The substantial difference in the course of intellectual property activity between the Supreme Court and Congress over the
past fourteen years strongly indicates that different factors are
influencing the different branches’ decision-making. 196 This is
193. Wyatt, supra note 192, at B6; Jenna Wortham, A Political Coming of
Age for the Tech Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2012, at A1.
194. Weisman, supra note 192.
195. This is not to deny that such influences also operated prior to this period, as much of the evidence indicates.
196. It is also true that Congress and the Supreme Court have different abilities to set their own agendas. Congress can pass legislation on any matter that
passes constitutional muster, while the Supreme Court is limited to deciding
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not surprising. Congress is made up of a large number of popularly elected representatives who serve for limited terms, have a
strong desire to get reelected, and can come from any background.197 The Supreme Court consists of nine Justices appointed for life, and though there is no constitutional requirement as such, all Supreme Court Justices have been trained in
the law, and there has not been a Supreme Court justice who did
not graduate from law school in over seventy years. 198 Even more
narrowly, nearly every Justice who served during the time period in question was appointed from a federal circuit court of appeals.199
Studies of Supreme Court decision-making tend to divide
the basis for decisions into three broad categories of influence:
legal reasoning, justice ideology, and popular opinion. 200 These
categories are generalizations and certainly not the only way to
conceptualize Supreme Court decisions, but they provide a useful framework for discussion. These influences are not mutually
exclusive, and can operate to varying degrees on different issues
and with different Justices. 201 Exploring these influences in relation to intellectual property decisions yields several insights.
cases or controversies that are presented to it. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art.
III, § 2. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). Given the number
of appeals seeking certiorari to the Supreme Court and the Court’s ability to
choose which cases it will grant certiorari in, however, the Court does have substantial agenda-setting authority. Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 399; Edward A. Hartnettal, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five
Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1718 (2000) (“[T]he power
to decide what to decide . . . enables the Court to set its own agenda.”).
197. Kareem Crayton, Legislative Politics and the Politics of Legislatures, 14
ELECTION L.J. 241, 244 (2015); Alan L. Feld, Congress and the Legislative Web
of Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 349, 350 (2001); Cristina M. Rodríguez, Constraint
Through Delegation: The Case of Executive Control Over Immigration Policy, 59
DUKE L.J. 1787, 1804–05 (2010).
198. Frequently Asked Questions, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/faq.aspx (Oct. 27, 2015).
199. See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
biographies.aspx (last visited Nov. 5, 2017). Justice Kagan is the only justice
who served during the period of study that was not previously an appellate
judge. Id.
200. Christopher J. Casillas et al., How Public Opinion Constrains the U.S.
Supreme Court, 55 AM. J. POL. SCI. 74, 86 (2011); Epstein & Martin, supra note
12, at 396, 404; Sag et al., supra note 5, at 802; Unah et al., supra note 12, at
299.
201. Cross & Nelson, supra note 152, at 1491–92; Epstein & Martin, supra
note 12, at 405. Certainly, for example, litigation is not free from special interest
group influence and advantage. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Have”
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1. Legal Reasoning
Though deductive legal reasoning based on legal rules may
be a traditional and common lay perception of Supreme Court
decision-making, it is implausible to attribute all intellectual
property decisions to such analysis. 202 Many Supreme Court intellectual property cases raise novel issues and cannot be framed
as being decided based solely, or even primarily, on reasoning
from binding legal authority. 203 For example, as discussed above,
four of the most high-profile patent cases during the period of
study concerned patent-eligible subject matter. 204 Doctrinally,
each of these decisions turned on whether a particular invention
fell within a judicially created exception to patent eligibility for
“abstract ideas, physical phenomena, and laws of nature.” 205 One
would be hard-pressed to find a concrete legal basis for this rule,
let alone the particular contours of the rule, in the Patent Act. 206
Instead, this doctrine was created by the Court, and some of it
was elaborated for the first time in these cases. 207 The original
judicial interpretation that guides the subject matter decisions
cannot be attributed to deductive reasoning from prior legal

Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 95 (1974).
202. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common
Law Intellectual Property, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1552 (2010); Sag et al., supra
note 5, at 810–11.
203. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 775, 789, 823 (2009) (making this
point about novelty with respect to cases in general).
204. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
205. Supra Part I.A.1 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309
(1980)).
206. Some attribute the basis of the subject-matter-exception doctrine to the
simple use of the word “invention” in section 101 of the Patent Act. Dan L. Burk,
The Curious Incident of the Supreme Court in Myriad Genetics, 90 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 505, 514, 524 (2014); Peter S. Menell, Forty Years of Wondering in the
Wilderness and No Closer to the Promised Land: Bilski’s Superficial Textualism
and the Missed Opportunity to Return Patent Law to Its Technology Mooring, 63
STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1292–93 (2011). Whether or not this single word can support such doctrine in general, it provides little basis for defining the scope of the
exclusion.
207. Miriam Bitton, Patenting Abstractions, 15 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 153, 162–
63 (2014); Menell, supra note 206, at 1292.
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rules. 208 Many other Supreme Court intellectual property decisions are similar in this regard.
The difference between congressional and Supreme Court
decision-making in patent and trademark law likewise belies an
argument that intellectual property decisions are simply the result of deductive legal reasoning. The Intellectual Property
Clause of the Constitution provides Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.” 209 Facially, this clause provides relatively few restrictions on Congress’s authority to legislate with respect to intellectual property law. For example, in
several high-profile cases discussed above, litigants argued that
the “promote the Progress” language must at least proscribe
Congress from passing intellectual property laws that grant retroactive rights and take subject matter out of the public domain. 210 The Supreme Court disagreed, and has consistently refused to read any significant limitations into Congress’s
intellectual property authority.211 Consequently, Congress has
extremely broad leeway to legislate in the context of intellectual
property law. Given this lack of constitutional constraint, it
seems improbable that the Supreme Court would reach starkly
divergent outcomes from Congress as the result of the Court’s
legal interpretation of Congress’s legislation. That is, it is doubtful that Congress persistently intends the Court to narrowly interpret Congress’s attempts to broaden patent and trademark
rights, and even more implausible that Congress would intend

208. Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2354–56; Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. at 2116–
18; Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1294, 1297–98; Bilski, 561 U.S. at
603–04, 608–09; see John F. Duffy, Why Business Method Patents?, 63 STAN. L.
REV. 1247, 1261 (2011) (“Most of the rules for finding patentable subject matter
have been judicially created.”); see also Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable,
75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 592 (2008) (“Current patentable subject matter jurisprudence is based not on actual issues the Court historically decided, but instead
on sweeping dicta that outlined unsubstantiated concerns about broad patent
claims.”).
209. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
210. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913
(2005); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
211. Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329, 1332, 1403, 1405 (2012); Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 317–18
(2004); Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Power, 94
GEO. L.J. 1771, 1829 (2006).
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the Court to follow such an approach in patent and trademark
cases, but the opposite approach in copyright cases.
2. Justice Ideology
Experts and scholars who analyze Supreme Court decisionmaking have identified a significant role for Justice ideology in
the Court’s decisions in several fields of law. 212 This attitudinal
model posits that Justices often reach decisions based on their
ideological beliefs and preferences as opposed to more traditional, theoretically value-free legal reasoning. 213 Numerous
studies find that the attitudinal model correlates with Supreme
Court decision-making to a greater extent than other models. 214
The attitudinal model has been developed and demonstrated primarily in relation to coding cases along a liberal-toconservative spectrum. 215 The attitudinal paradigm, however, is
commonly perceived as having “little or no relevance” to Supreme Court decision-making in intellectual property cases. 216
Under this view, the traditional liberal-conservative divide that
tends to define attitudinal decision-making has only limited im-

212. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 191–202, 221–31, 245–71 (1993); see also Tracey E.
George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision-Making, 86
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323, 325–26 (1992). But see Dan M. Kahan et al., “Ideology”
or “Situation Sense”? An Experimental Investigation of Motivated Reasoning
and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 411–13 (2016) (reporting
an experiment indicating that judges tend not to be ideologically driven when
engaging in statutory interpretation).
213. Jack M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1153
(1991); George & Epstein, supra note 212, at 325–26, 334.
214. George & Epstein, supra note 212, at 325; Sag et al., supra note 5, at
802; Unah et al., supra note 12, at 295 (“ The attitudinal model is a well-established behavioral theory of U.S. Supreme Court decision-making.”). The attitudinal model is part of common lay perceptions about Supreme Court decisionmaking, exemplified by routine media attention to ideological divisions among
the Justices. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The Polarized Court, N.Y. TIMES: SUNDAY
REV., May 11, 2014, at 1 (discussing ideological polarization on the Court); David Paul Kuhn, The Incredible Polarization and Politicization of the Supreme
Court, ATLANTIC (June 29, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/
2012/06/the-incredible-polarization-and-politicization-of-the-supreme-court/
259155 (analyzing ideological polarization on the Court).
215. Sag et al., supra note 5, at 805–06; Jeff Yates & Elizabeth Coggins, The
Intersection of Judicial Attitudes and Litigant Selection Theories: Explaining
U.S. Supreme Court Decision-Making, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 263, 270–75
(2009).
216. Sag et al., supra note 5, at 809.
THE
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port for intellectual property issues, and therefore does not significantly affect such cases. 217 Such analysis places intellectual
property issues in the same category as some other types of economic cases that do not appear to be particularly ideologically
driven.218
This perspective is consistent with the Supreme Court Justices’ voting patterns in the intellectual property cases studied
here. The Court issued unanimous opinions in twenty-three of
the thirty-four substantive intellectual property decisions during the period of study, just over two-thirds of the cases. The
Court’s rate of unanimous opinions in all other cases during this
period is around 35%, far lower than in the intellectual property
decisions. 219 Further, not a single one of the Court’s forty-four
intellectual property cases was decided by a five to four vote, in
comparison with over 20% of the Court’s opinions in other
fields.220 In other words, the Court reaches unanimous decisions
in intellectual property cases nearly twice as often as in non-intellectual property cases, and does not divide along its usual liberal-conservative axis. These data indicate that the Court was
not substantially driven by political ideology in intellectual property cases during the period of study. 221
217. CRAIG ALLEN NARD & R. POLK WAGNER, PATENT LAW 33 (2008) (“Patent law issues rarely separate neatly along political party lines.”); Ann Bartow,
When Bias Is Bipartisan: Teaching About the Democratic Process in an Intellectual Property Law Republic, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 715, 715 (2008) (“[I]dentification as a Democrat or Republican does not provide too much guidance or create
too many expectations about a person’s view of intellectual property issues.”);
Sag et al., supra note 5, at 811 (“[A] more plausible explanation . . . is that judicial policy preferences regarding IP do not fit within the stereotypical view of
the liberal-conservative ideological continuum.”).
218. See, e.g., Nancy Staudt et al., The Ideological Component of Judging in
the Taxation Context, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1797, 1799 (2006) (finding no ideology
effect on Supreme Court Justice decision-making in taxation cases in general,
though finding an effect in corporate tax cases); E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert
B. Thompson, The Supreme Court and Private Law: The Vanishing Importance
of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L.J. 1571, 1572 (2004) (concluding that
Supreme Court justice ideology does not appear to affect decision-making in securities and antitrust cases); see also Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme
Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting
Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1150–51 (2004)
(finding that legal experts had a particularly difficult time predicting Supreme
Court outcomes in economic cases).
219. Sunstein, supra note 3.
220. Id. at 782.
221. To be more precise, the data indicates that the Justices are not ideologically driven from a liberal-versus-conservative perspective. It is possible that
the Justices are being driven by some other, nonpolitical ideology. Infra Part
II.B.3.
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Professors Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi, and Maxim Sytch
conducted a comprehensive empirical study on the effect of judicial ideology on Supreme Court intellectual property decisions
from 1954 to 2006. The authors found a minor ideological effect
indicating that the more conservative a Justice is, the more
likely the Justice was to vote in favor of an intellectual property
owner.222 Politically liberal Justices, on the other hand, did not
show any correlation with deciding cases against intellectual
property owners. 223 The effect of ideology on intellectual property cases was significantly lower than the effect of ideology on
Supreme Court decision-making in other legal fields.224 As in the
instant study, the authors found that the Justices agreed with
each other more often in intellectual property cases than in Supreme Court cases generally.225 Based on their analysis, the authors concluded that the then-incipient Roberts Court would be
more supportive of stronger intellectual property rights than the
prior court. 226 This prediction did not prove to be accurate, as the
case analysis above reveals that the Roberts Court has been hostile to patent and trademark rights nearly across the board, although the Court has been receptive to copyright protection.
Thus, in the Supreme Court’s recent cases, political ideology
does not appear to be playing even the limited role that it may
have played earlier.
Several empirical studies have examined judicial ideology
and intellectual property decision-making in specific contexts.
For example, Professor Barton Beebe has studied whether political ideology affected judicial decision-making in cases involving
certain copyright and trademark issues, and found no effect in
either context.227 Kimberly Moore, now herself a Federal Circuit
judge, examined whether a judge’s political ideology affected
their decisions in patent claim construction cases, and likewise
found no effect.228 These studies did not focus on Supreme Court
decisions.
222. Sag et al., supra note 5, at 838–40.
223. Id. at 845.
224. Id. at 846.
225. Id. at 822, 835.
226. Id. at 851.
227. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1647–48 (2006); Barton Beebe, Does
Judicial Ideology Affect Copyright Fair Use Outcomes?: Evidence from the Fair
Use Case Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 517, 521 (2008).
228. Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 38–39 (2001).
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In sum, the data indicate that Justice ideology appears to
play little to no role in Supreme Court intellectual property decisions during the time period under study. This is not entirely
surprising. As discussed earlier, people tend not to have strongly
held views on intellectual property protection, and the Supreme
Court Justices who served during this term had limited prior experience in intellectual property law. 229 The Justices all went to
law school at a time before intellectual property courses were a
common part of the law school curriculum. 230 Specific experience
in a legal field is hardly a necessary antecedent to having an ideological position about issues on the matter, but there is little
evidence from their backgrounds to indicate that the Justices
who have served on the Supreme Court during the period of
study brought particular ideological views about intellectual
property law to the Court with them.231
3. Popular Opinion
The analysis above indicates that the Supreme Court’s intellectual property decisions cannot generally be explained by
deductive legal reasoning or Justice ideology. Perhaps popular
opinion is playing a greater role. At first glance, the notion that
popular opinion is significantly influencing Supreme Court decisions appears antithetical to paradigmatic notions of American
governmental roles. Congress, and the President, are traditionally expected to be the branches of government that are most
responsive to popular will. 232 The Supreme Court, on the other
hand, is designed to act as a countermajoritarian check on Con-

229. See generally Biographies of the Justices, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www
.scotusblog.com/reference/educational-resources/biographies-of-the-justices
(last visited Nov. 5, 2017). Justice Breyer ’s authoring a well-known article on
copyright law in 1970 is a notable exception. Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case
for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970). For a discussion of tangential connections
between the Justices and intellectual property law, see infra note 258.
230. The current Supreme Court Justices graduated from law school between 1959 and 1986. Biographies of the Justices, supra note 229.
231. Again, Justice Breyer ’s article on copyright law is an exception, though
ironically the article is critical of copyright expansionism, whereas copyright
law is the one area of intellectual property where the Court has tended to
strengthen rights. See generally Breyer, supra note 229.
232. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2359 (2006); Frederick Schauer, Foreword: The
Court’s Agenda—and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 5 (2006).
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gress when necessary to protect against the potentially unconstitutional tyranny of the majority.233
A growing body of empirical evidence indicates that this
commonly held political perspective may be somewhat reversed
in practice. Rather than being countermajoritarian, the Supreme Court often appears to act in concert with majoritarian
preferences—or with what the Court believes to be majoritarian
preferences.234
The “countermajoritarian difficulty” is a term given to the
seemingly paradoxical ability of an unelected Supreme Court to
thwart the will of the representative branches.235 Defending this
governmental structure as legitimate in a democracy has been
seen as a significant challenge in constitutional theory. 236 Recent
work indicates that the countermajoritarian difficulty may not
be as significant a problem in practice as it has been conceived
historically. Work by a number of legal empiricists, political scientists, and legal historians indicates that the Supreme Court
often issues opinions consistent with national public opinion
trends. 237 Justice Anthony Kennedy recognized this relationship: “In the long term, the court is not antimajoritarian—it’s
majoritarian.” 238

233. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Countermajoritarian Opportunity, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 353, 360–69 (2010) (“When other [branches] have
made decisions infringing on fundamental rights, the court may be called upon
to play a special role in regulating these officials in a countermajoritarian fashion.”).
234. Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 277; Corinna Barrett Lain, UpsideDown Judicial Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113, 116, 158 (2012); Jeff Yates et al., For
the Times They Are A-Changin’: Explaining Voting Patterns of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices Through Identification of Micro-Publics, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 117,
122 (2013).
235. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AS THE BAR OF POLITICS 16–23 (1962); Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: The Road to Judicial Supremacy (pt.
1), 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 335 (1998); Unah et al., supra note 12, at 298.
236. Friedman, supra note 235, at 334–36; Lain, supra note 234, at 114–15;
David S. Law, A Theory of Judicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J.
723, 727 (2009).
237. Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 280; Lain, supra note 234, at 115,
167; Law, supra note 236, at 729 (“As a historical matter, the Supreme Court’s
decisions have been, whether by coincidence or design, largely in sync with public opinion.”); Unah et al., supra note 12, at 310.
238. Jason DeParle, In Battle to Pick Next Justice, Right Says Avoid a Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2005, at A1.
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Professors Lee Epstein and Andrew Martin have conducted
one of the most comprehensive analyses of the relationship between Supreme Court decision-making and public opinion. 239
These scholars compared the ideological disposition of every
orally argued Supreme Court decision from 1958 to 2008 against
the public mood at the time, based on a commonly used quarterly
measure of public mood among American adults. 240 Controlling
for numerous factors, including the ideology of the Supreme
Court median Justice, the direction of the decision on appeal,
and the ideology of the President, the House, and the Senate, the
analysis finds a statistically significant correlation between the
public mood at the time of oral argument and the ideological propensity of the Supreme Court decision. 241
In a similar vein, Professor Corinna Barrett Lain conducted
a detailed historical review of three seminal Supreme Court
cases that are typically identified as exemplifying the countermajoritarian difficulty: Brown v. Board of Education, 242 Furman
v. Georgia, 243 and Roe v. Wade.244 Based on a variety of contemporary accounts, judicial writings, and public opinion data, she
concludes that in each case the Court reached an outcome that
the Justices believed was consistent with the direction of public
opinion.245 A number of other studies are in accord with both Epstein and Martin’s and Lain’s analyses. 246 As Chief Justice
239. Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 263–67, 271–74.
240. Id. at 272.
241. Id. at 277.
242. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
243. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
244. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), holding modified by Planned
Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 504 U.S. 833 (1992).
245. Lain, supra note 234, at 125, 131, 135 (“Brown presents a striking example of the Supreme Court responding to, and reflecting, deep shifts in prevailing norms when the democratic process would not . . . . The Justices in Furman’s majority saw their ruling in fundamentally majoritarian terms . . . .
Rather than a Supreme Court thwarting majority will, Roe shows a Supreme
Court vindicating it—again responding to, and reflecting, deep shifts in public
opinion when change through the democratic process was blocked.”).
246. THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE REHNQUIST COURT
(2008) (finding that the Supreme Court decisions since the 1930s have been consistent with public opinion data over 60% of the time); Casillas et al., supra note
200, at 79 (finding that “public mood has both a significant short- and long-run
influence on the Court’s decisions” for a dataset of Supreme Court cases from
1956 to 2000); Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous
Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public
Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018, 1033 (2004) (“We have found that the Court’s policy
outcomes are indeed affected by public opinion, but to a degree far greater than
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Rehnquist stated, “[Justices] go home at night and read the
newspapers or watch the evening news on television; they talk
to their family and friends about current events . . . [and cannot]
escape being influenced by public opinion.” 247
Though we cannot know for sure, a variety of circumstantial
evidence supports the conclusion that the Supreme Court’s decisions in intellectual property cases may be driven in significant
part by popular opinion. This is not to assert that public opinion
is the only mechanism affecting Supreme Court decisions in intellectual property, or that it explains all decisions. But public
opinion appears to play a notable role, one that has not previously been recognized.
It may appear counterintuitive to suggest that public opinion is affecting Supreme Court intellectual property decisions
when the public has limited knowledge of intellectual property
law and does not appear to pay significant attention to such issues. 248 Low knowledge, however, is not a barrier to strongly
held opinions,249 and limited attention does not mean that there
is no influence. Several lines of evidence support the hypothesis
that the Supreme Court’s intellectual property decisions tend to
reflect popular sentiment.
First, popular opinion about intellectual property law is consistent with the tendency of Supreme Court decisions in patent
and trademark law. Survey data reveals that the popular perception of intellectual property rights is that they are too
strong.250 These public preferences are found across a variety of
subject matter, from medicine to literary works and from music
previously documented.”); David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 859, 864–87 (2009) (discussing the Court’s shift
in death penalty, sex-based classification/equal protection, and substantive due
process cases as instances of the Court moving towards public opinion); Unah
et al., supra note 12, at 310 (finding “a strong and robust association between
public mood and the direction of Supreme Court decisions” for a dataset of Supreme Court cases spanning 1952 to 2011). See generally Jane S. Schacter, Commentary, What Marriage Equality Can Tell Us About Popular Constitutionalism (and Vice Versa), 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1147 (2015) (analyzing the shift in public
opinion favoring same-sex marriage and equating it with the recent legal developments moving in the same direction).
247. William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 751, 768 (1986).
248. Mandel et al., supra note 164, at 956.
249. Dan M. Kahan et al., The Polarizing Impact of Science Literacy and
Numeracy on Perceived Climate Change Risks, 2 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 732
(2012).
250. Mandel et al., supra note 164, at 937–43.
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to engineering. 251 Though formal legal reasoning and Justice
ideology do a poor job of explaining Supreme Court intellectual
property outcomes, public opinion does correlate with these results.
Second, one of the strongest signatures that we see in the
Supreme Court data is the divergence between the copyright
cases and the patent and trademark cases. Research indicates
that popular opinions about what intellectual property law
should be are more consistent with copyright law than with patent law. 252 This finding could explain a Court that is more likely
to harmonize with the direction of Congress’s action in copyright
than in patent law.
Third, there is the wealth of unanimous decisions in intellectual property cases during the period under study, a rate that
exceeds unanimous decisions in other fields of law by nearly two
to one. Public opinion influence on Supreme Court Justice voting
can explain this unanimity quite clearly; most other explanatory
mechanisms that have been offered cannot.
Fourth, this proposition about intellectual property decisions dovetails precisely with the types of cases in which public
opinion is expected to hold the greatest sway. Recent studies of
the relationship between popular preferences and Supreme
Court decision-making find that the correlation is strongest in
nonsalient and unpolarized cases. 253 Intellectual property law
fits this mold. The degree of unanimity in the intellectual property cases shows that they tend not to be polarized at the
Court. 254 Salience is defined in the pertinent studies based on
whether a given decision was reported on the front page of the
New York Times.255 Only one of the forty-four Supreme Court
251. Id. at 949.
252. Gregory N. Mandel, The Public Perception of Intellectual Property, 66
FLA. L. REV. 261, 292 (2014). This study did not test trademark attitudes.
253. Casillas et al., supra note 200, at 83–84 (finding stronger effects in nonsalient cases); Unah et al., supra note 12, at 313–16 (finding the strongest effects in unpolarized, nonsalient cases).
254. Nonsalient cases do not necessarily tend to be unpolarized. Stephen
Burbank and Sean Farhang found that Supreme Court cases concerning private
enforcement rights, for a time period overlapping the present study, are also
nonsalient, but highly polarized. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, The
Subterranean Counterrevolution: The Supreme Court, the Media, and Litigation
Reform, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 293, 314–19 (2016).
255. Casillas et al., supra note 200, at 81; Unah et al., supra note 12, at 309;
see also Burbank & Farhang, supra note 254, at 10 (reporting that most members of the public acquire their information about Supreme Court decisions from
the mass media).
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intellectual property decisions under discussion merited such
coverage.256 The authors of one study even specifically identified
patent law as a field that “may be highly consequential” but that
is not salient for the public. 257 The characteristics of intellectual
property cases strongly align with the types of cases on which
public opinion tends to have the greatest influence on the Court.
Finally, additional support for the public-influence theory
can be gleaned from a more nuanced unanimity analysis. While
the Supreme Court reached unanimous decisions in 68% of its
substantive intellectual property decisions, it was unanimous in
only 40% of the intellectual property decisions coded as neutral
in the dataset. In addition, of the Court’s twenty-three unanimous decisions in intellectual property cases that substantively
strengthened or weakened rights, twenty-two were in patent and
trademark. Thus, unanimity was achieved far more often in substantive patent cases (78%) and trademark cases (100%) than in
substantive copyright cases (14%). The patent and trademark
cases are precisely the areas in which the Supreme Court deviates from Congress; in copyright law cases, the Court and Congress remain in accord. Something is causing the Supreme Court
to reach unanimous agreement in an overwhelming percentage
of substantive patent and trademark decisions, but rarely in
non-substantive decisions in these same fields or in copyright
cases. In other words, it is not intellectual property law per se on
which the Supreme Court tends to be unanimous, or even patent
and trademark law in particular. Rather, it is substantive patent
and trademark decisions that weaken intellectual property
owner rights where the agreement is strong. 258 Public sentiment
leery of strong patent and trademark rights could explain this
divergence; few other rationales appear able to do so.
This unanimity evidence also indicates that the Supreme
Court’s twenty-first-century intellectual property jurisprudence
256. Adam Liptak, Justices, 9–0, Bar Patenting Human Genes, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13, 2013, at A1.
257. Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About
Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515, 1549 (2010).
258. Some commentators have attempted to explain the Court’s unanimity
in patent cases as a result of the Court’s lack of expertise in the field and reaction to the Federal Circuit. See Holbrook, supra note 58, at 71–77; see also Laura
G. Pedraza-Fariña, Understanding the Federal Circuit: An Expert Community
Approach, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 89, 123–27 (2015) (discussing how the Federal Circuit functioning as an expert community may affect its interaction with
the Supreme Court). This rationale, however, cannot explain the pattern of unanimity revealed here, which includes substantive trademark cases but not neutral patent decisions.
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is not simply a patent-specific reaction against the Federal Circuit or patent troll concerns. This is not to say that such issues
played no role in the Court’s patent law cases, only that there
are additional factors at play. In addition, even though the Court
may not have been reacting to these issues directly, popular concern about the direction of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence
and patent trolls may have catalyzed the Supreme Court Justices’ views in these cases. Under this view, those who have argued that the Court responded to the Federal Circuit or patent
troll rhetoric have the correlation correct, but fail to recognize
the intermediary influence of public opinion driving this relationship.
4. Mechanisms of Public Influence

The evidence supporting the public opinion hypothesis
raises questions concerning how popular sentiment might influence the Court and whether such sentiment concerning patent
and trademark law can be identified. Epstein and Martin are explicit that they cannot identify the causal relationship between
Supreme Court decisions and public mood from their data. 259
The dominant view, particularly in the political science literature, has been that Supreme Court decisions tend to align with
public preferences because the Justices strategically bend to the
will of the people in an effort to maintain public support and remain an effective, legitimate branch of government in the absence of popular election. 260 This rationale has been theorized in
relation to certain patent decisions.261 The same relationship,
however, could also arise because Supreme Court Justices are
human beings and members of the public; the same factors that
affect public opinion generally may affect Supreme Court Justices as well. 262 As Justice Ruth Ginsburg recently noted about

259. Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 264.
260. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 14 (2009); Baum & Devins, supra note 257, at 1580; Unah et al., supra
note 12, at 299; see also Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 264 n.3; Timothy
R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Expressive Eligibility, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 973,
979–85 (2015) (discussing how the Supreme Court’s decisions in patent law
cases may be an attempt to express a level of accountability); Yates et al., supra
note 234, at 123–24.
261. Holbrook & Janis, supra note 260 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
subject matter cases support the patent system’s legitimacy by letting the public
know, for example, that there are outer boundaries of what is patentable).
262. Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 264, 281; Unah et al., supra note
12, at 300; Yates et al., supra note 234, at 124–26.
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the Court, “Inevitably, it will be affected by the climate of the
era.” 263
Which of these two causal relationships is at play (the Court
directly seeking to satisfy public preferences or indirectly being
a part of the public mood) has been heavily debated. 264 Several
researchers have recently attempted to answer this question,
but study design in this context is quite difficult and the results
have been mixed. 265
The Supreme Court’s decisions in intellectual property cases
shed new light on this question. Recall that intellectual property
studies reveal that most members of the public have relatively
limited knowledge about intellectual property issues and that intellectual property issues tend not to align with traditional ideological debates. 266 It would seem implausible, on this basis, to
reason that the Supreme Court would feel the need to bend to
the will of the public in order to achieve popular legitimacy on
intellectual property law. 267
263. Adam Liptak, Right Divided, Disciplined Left Steered Justices, N.Y.
TIMES, July 1, 2015, at A21. A third possibility for a mechanism that some have
proposed is the judicial appointments process, but this means of influence would
imply static Supreme Court Justice preferences that are unaffected by changes
in public opinion over time, a possibility that is belied by the data. Lain, supra
note 234, at 160.
264. Baum & Devins, supra note 257, at 1547–55, 1562; Burbank & Farhang, supra note 254, at 303–07; Casillas et al., supra note 200, at 74–75; Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 264 n.3; Yates et al., supra note 234, at 123–
26.
265. See, e.g., Casillas et al., supra note 200, at 78 (attempting to control for
the social forces that might affect all individuals by creating a measure of national policy based on military spending and a measure of policy liberalism derived from a set of economic indicators). Compare id. at 75 (concluding based on
an empirical analysis “that while social forces indeed influence the justices’ ideology. . .[,] controlling for these factors, public opinion maintains a statistically
significant effect on the Court’s decisions”), with Micheal W. Giles et al., The
Supreme Court in American Democracy: Unraveling the Linkages Between Public Opinion and Judicial Decision Making, 70. J. POL. 293, 303 (2008) (concluding based on an analysis of individual Justice’s votes that the “most likely explanation” for the correlation between public opinion and Supreme Court
decisions is the Justices being swayed by the same forces that also influence the
public).
266. See supra Part II.B.2.
267. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 254, at 319–20 (concluding that
the Supreme Court is less constrained by popular opinion on issues of lower
public visibility). Some scholars, conversely, have argued that Justices may feel
a need to bend to the will of the public in nonsalient cases to build a reservoir
of diffuse public support that enables them to buck popular preferences in more
salient cases. Casillas et al., supra note 200, at 81–82. As others have stated, it
is hard to imagine that this reservoir is necessary given that (1) the Court’s
“legitimacy is largely impervious to [public] disagreement” with its decisions,

856

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:803

The correlation between Supreme Court decisions and popular preferences on intellectual property issues appears much
more likely to result from the fact that the Supreme Court Justices are members of a public whose opinions are shaped by the
events and forces that influence society more generally. It is certainly possible that the Supreme Court is also acting strategically at the same time, as these causal mechanisms are not mutually exclusive. 268 But the data here indicate that the
previously less appreciated effects of Supreme Court Justices being part and parcel of their time and culture are having a significant effect in at least some fields.
Some Justices have made statements that are in accord with
this analysis. Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote: “Judges,
so long as they are relatively normal human beings, can no more
escape being influenced by public opinion in the long run than
can people working at other jobs.” 269 Justice Benjamin Cardozo
reflected, “The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of
men, do not turn aside in their course, and pass the judges by.” 270
Even Justice Antonin Scalia, a longtime proponent of an
originalist approach to interpretation, has acknowledged, “[I]t’s
a little unrealistic to talk about the Court as though it’s a continuous, unchanging institution rather than to some extent necessarily a reflection of the society in which it functions.” 271
That the Supreme Court appears to be influenced by the
public mood, regardless of the mechanism, raises a subsequent
issue of trying to determine which segment of the public is influencing the Court. Though Epstein and Martin’s work focused on
national public mood data, 272 subsequent empirical research indicates that micro-publics, rather than broad-based national
public opinion, are a more accurate indicator of Justice decisionmaking. 273 Justices, like everyone else, have a variety of personal, social, and work relationships that can be expected to

and (2) the Court would be hard-pressed to build public support in nonsalient
intellectual property cases given the public’s lack of attention to such matters.
Baum & Devins, supra note 257, at 1548–52.
268. Yates et al., supra note 234, at 126.
269. Rehnquist, supra note 247.
270. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168
(1921).
271. Yates et al., supra note 234, at 138–39 (quoting McGuire & Stimson,
supra note 246, at 1020).
272. Epstein & Martin, supra note 12, at 269.
273. Yates et al., supra note 234, at 137–38.
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shape their perceptions and beliefs.274 In the case of Supreme
Court Justices, these relationships tend to be among societal
“elites,” individuals of higher education and socioeconomic status than the general public. 275 For the Justices, this would likely
include lawyers and legal communities in particular. As Professors Lawrence Baum and Neal Devins concluded after a comprehensive analysis of prior studies and new data, “[The evidence]
supports the conclusion that elites are more important to the
Justices, and exert more impact on their choices, than does the
public as a whole.” 276 It is not surprising that Justices would be
more affected by the populations that they are a part of and identify with because such populations are presumably the most important to the Justices. 277
Though the evidence discussed above indicates that most
people pay little attention to, and have limited knowledge of, intellectual property issues, there is evidence that the higher socioeconomic status cohort that Supreme Court Justices are a part
of may be paying more attention. 278 An analysis of the use of the
term “intellectual property” in news articles in the New York
Times, in Westlaw’s news databases, and in sources available on
Google Books all indicate a dramatic rise in the use of the term
from the 1980s through the present day. In each case, there is
continually increasing use of the term in every five-year block
from 1980 through 2015, with the phrase being used over forty
times more often presently than it was thirty-five years ago.279
274. Id. at 128–35 (detailing various correlations between Justices’ voting
behavior and different aspects of their lives).
275. Baum & Devins, supra note 257, at 1579–80. The Supreme Court’s decisions “on controversial social issues are more consistent with the views of
highly educated people than with the views of the populace as a whole.” Id. at
1570–71.
276. Id. at 1579. It appears that this effect may be particularly true of swing
Justices. Id. at 1581.
277. Id. at 1537–38.
278. See Burbank & Farhang, supra note 254, at 300–03 (discussing how
studies have demonstrated that the public in general “knows little about the
Court’s decisions,” but that the better-educated, more-attentive public is better
informed).
279. A search of articles appearing in the New York Times for the term “intellectual property” yields the following numbers of hits for the identified time
periods: 1/1/1981–12/31/1985, 49; 1/1/1986–12/31/1990, 291; 1/1/1991–
12/31/1995, 398; 1/1/1996–12/31/2000, 721; 1/1/2001–12/31/2005, 1,009;
1/1/2006–12/31/2010, 1,402; 1/1/2011–12/31/2015, 1,683. A search of Westlaw’s
databases for the term “intellectual property” yields the following numbers of
hits for the identified time periods: 1/1/1981–12/31/1985, 1,392; 1/1/1986–
12/31/1990, 2,743; 1/1/1991–12/31/1995, 9,203; 1/1/1996–12/31/2000, 25,109;
1/1/2001–12/31/2005, 47,227; 1/1/2006–12/31/2010, 54,705; 1/1/2011–
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In addition to greater public attention to intellectual property law among elites, the Justices have seen a vast increase in
the scope of amicus briefs filed in intellectual property cases,
both seeking certiorari and on the merits. 280 Several of the Justices have also interacted directly with intellectual property law:
they have written on intellectual property issues, 281 have had
law clerks or close relatives who are experts in intellectual property law, 282 and have argued intellectual property cases and decided intellectual property cases as appellate and district court
judges.283 As a result, there are a variety of manners in which
elite attention to intellectual property law is likely working its
way into Supreme Court Justice consciousness.
This suite of circumstantial evidence is not definitive, but
combining it appears to paint a picture that more-educated,
wealthier, legally-attuned individuals paid substantially more
attention to intellectual property issues during the time period
12/31/2015, 55,034. Google Books data is via a search of the term “intellectual
property” on Google Books’ “Ngram Viewer,” available at https://books.google
.com/ngrams.
280. Balganesh, supra note 202, at 1594; Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus
Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach Us About the Patent System, 1 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 395, 399 (2011); see amicus briefs cited infra note 294.
281. See Stephen Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75
(1972); Breyer, supra note 229.
282. To note a handful of examples, the following judges, scholars, and practitioners all specialize in intellectual property law: Richard Taranto, Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals Circuit Judge, clerked for Justice O’Connor; Kevin Collins, Professor of Law at Washington University Law School, clerked for Justice
Sotomayor while she was on the Second Circuit; Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pauline
Newman Professor of Law at NYU Law School, clerked for Chief Justice Burger;
Jeanne Fromer, Professor of Law at NYU Law School, clerked for Justice
Souter; Jane Ginsburg, Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic
Property Law at Columbia Law School, is Justice Ginsburg’s daughter; John
Golden, Loomer Family Professor in Law at the University of Texas Law School,
clerked for Justice Breyer; Scott Hemphill, Professor of Law at NYU Law
School, clerked for Justice Scalia; Lawrence Lessig, Roy L. Furman Professor of
Law at Harvard Law School, clerked for Justice Scalia; Ronald Mann, Albert E.
Cinelli Enterprise Professor of Law at Columbia Law School, clerked for Justice
Powell; Molly Van Houwelling, Associate Dean at Berkeley, clerked for Justice
Souter; Jeffrey Wall, Special Counsel at Sullivan & Cromwell LLP, clerked for
Justice Thomas; Timothy Wu, Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law at
Columbia Law School, clerked for Justice Breyer.
283. E.g., Justice Roberts argued both TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 1255, Transcript of Oral Argument at 2 (2000) (No. 991571), 2000 WL 1808274, at *2 and Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,
118 S. Ct. 1279, Transcript of Oral Argument at 2 (1998) (No. 96-1768), 1998
WL 29550, at *2; Justice Kagan was involved with several intellectual property
cases in her service as Solicitor General from 2009–2010. E.g., Bilski v. Kappos,
130 S. Ct. 3218, 3223 (2010).

2017]

INSTITUTIONAL FRACTURE

859

in question, and at the same time displayed a growing concern
about the strength of intellectual property rights. 284 Supreme
Court Justices, as members of these micro-publics, may well
have been affected in the same manner.
C. REEVALUATING THE SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESSIONAL
INFLUENCES
That elite popular opinion appears to play an underappreciated role in influencing Supreme Court decision-making on intellectual property issues raises the question of why Congress
does not appear to be swayed by similar constituent preferences.
Completing the cycle of flipping the countermajoritarian difficulty, legal scholars and political scientists have produced a variety of evidence and analyses indicating that the theoretically
representative branches of government often act in countermajoritarian ways. 285 Special interest group influence is one strong
example of such an effect. A variety of other work has identified
democratic failings in the elected branches of government that
have similar consequences. Myriad well-known challenges can
limit democratic accountability, including political polarization,
social choice voting issues, the Senate filibuster, committee
roles, gerrymandered electoral districts, incumbency protection,
and other influences. 286 As Corinna Lain writes, “This recognition turns the countermajoritarian difficulty on its head . . . . Instead of a countermajoritarian Court checking the majoritarian
branches, we see a majoritarian Court checking the not-so-majoritarian branches.”287 The results of the instant study of judi-

284. While more-educated, wealthier individuals tend to prefer stronger intellectual property rights relative to less-educated, less-wealthy individuals,
they still believe that intellectual property rights are too strong. Mandel et al.,
supra note 164, at 970.
285. FRIEDMAN, supra note 260; Mark A. Graber, The Countermajoritarian
Difficulty: From Courts to Congress to Constitutional Order, 4 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 361, 362 (2008) (“[S]cholarly concern with democratic deficits in American constitutionalism has shifted from the courts to electoral institutions.”);
Lain, supra note 234, at 120–44.
286. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46–60
(1951); Lain, supra note 234, at 115–16, 148; Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center
Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF.
L. REV. 273, 329–30 (2011).
287. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS
SERVE AMERICA 4 (2006); Lain, supra note 234, at 116. But see Friedman, supra
note 235, at 370 (describing how the Marshall Court’s treatment of the Burr
conspiracy trials was met by public outrage).
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cial and legislative action in the first part of the twenty-first century adds intellectual property to the list of fields in which the
Supreme Court appears to be acting in a more majoritarian manner than Congress. This is significant as intellectual property is
the first area of private law in which this trend has been identified.288
How did this situation arise in intellectual property law? As
with many social and cultural phenomena, there are likely an
eclectic set of forces at play that operate in varied manners. It
would be implausible to identify all the influences that have had
an impact, but one factor that likely played a significant role for
intellectual property was a shift in innovative industries’ relationship to patent law. The growth of the information technology
and software industries in the 1990s led to the rise of economically and politically powerful industry segments and several of
today’s largest companies (including Google, Amazon, and Facebook) that interact with patent law in a significantly different
manner than traditional industries. 289 Rather than viewing patent protection as a necessary means to be able to profit off of
innovation and intellectual assets, large industry players in the
information technology and software industries sometimes encounter patenting as a barrier to innovation. 290 This perception
may arise because of companies’ needs to design around other
entities’ patents, to license necessary patented infrastructure, or
concern over (potentially frivolous) lawsuits by parties who claim
infringement of a patent that may have had little to do with current products.291 The rise of powerful industries that view
stronger patent protection as problematic led to historic clashes
throughout the period in question between information technol-

288. Prior work in this vein has generally focused on public law issues involving civil liberties. See, e.g., Lain, supra note 234, at 116 n.11, 119–44 (surveying prior work in this area as well as discussing her own).
289. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 137, at 49–58, 156–58; Ronald J. Mann,
Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961,
968–98 (2005).
290. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 137, at 156–58; Mandel, supra note 184,
at 23; Lea Shaver, Illuminating Innovation: From Patent Racing to Patent War,
69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1891, 1895 (2012) (stating “there are good reasons to
believe that patents may also impede innovation by creating barriers to competition”).
291. Barnett, supra note 184, at 440–41; Robert P. Merges, Software and
Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627, 1631–32
(2007).
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ogy and software industry groups on the one hand, and pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry groups on the other. 292 The
six-year debate over the AIA described above represents a prime
example;293 these factions also butted heads in many of the Supreme Court cases analyzed earlier as well. 294
Intriguingly, the entities arguing for weaker patent protection appear to have gotten the better of the public perception debates, or at least the better of the elite public opinion perceptions
that Supreme Court Justices are more likely to be influenced by
and be a part of. Recent data indicates that this success may not
simply be the result of the information technology and software
industries having had the better position or having made better
arguments. Rather, researchers have found that the American
public is more receptive to arguments in favor of weaker intellectual property protection than they are to arguments in favor
of stronger protection. 295
This account appears plausible as an explanation for the Supreme Court’s decision-making in patent cases, but does not explain their action in trademark cases (where the Court was similarly hostile to intellectual property rights) or copyright cases
(where the Court supported stronger protection). The trademark
valence could have flowed on the coattails of public opinion concerning patent law. For people who do not focus in intellectual
property law, drawing distinctions between the various areas
within intellectual property can appear somewhat nuanced. In

292. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 137, at 100–02; Anderson, supra note 141,
at 982–84; David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127, 135–36, 149 n.124 (2009); see also Anderson, supra note 59, at 1075; Matal, Part I, supra note 137, at 453–66 (detailing the
intense legislative debate concerning passage of the AIA).
293. Supra Part I.B.4.
294. See, e.g., Brief for Google, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (No. 13-298),
2014 WL 828041; Brief for Genentech, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107 (2013) (No. 12-398), 2013 WL 1098262; Brief for Biotechnology Indus. Org.
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No. 10-1150), 2011 WL 5373695; Brief
for Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012) (No.
10-1150), 2011 WL 5373698.
295. Anne A. Fast et al., Experimental Investigations on the Basis for Intellectual Property Rights, 40 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 458, 470–71 (2016).
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fact, the lay public tends not to distinguish their opinions between the different areas of intellectual property law. 296 Further, though patent law and trademark law are strikingly different fields, they may be linked in popular perception due to the
existence of the PTO. In particular, much of the criticism that
was leveled against patent law in the past decade-plus was directed at the PTO itself. 297
Why is there a difference in the Supreme Court’s copyright
jurisprudence? The empirical study of Supreme Court ideology
discussed earlier, based on intellectual property decisions from
1954 to 2006, similarly found that the Supreme Court tended to
favor copyright owners to a greater extent than patent or trademark owners. 298 The authors hypothesized that this difference
might arise (a) because copyright infringers are only liable for
actual copying (whereas independent inventors can be liable for
patent infringement); (b) because Supreme Court Justices as
writers may be “more sympathetic to the romantic myth of the
author underlying copyright [law]”; or (c) because the Justices
are less concerned about overbreadth in copyright protection due
to its numerous exceptions and limitations.299 As discussed
above, recent data indicates that public preferences tend to align
with copyright law to a greater extent than patent law, perhaps
resulting in less pushback against stronger copyright protection
at the Court.300 Though none of these explanations is definitive,
the analysis in the current study extends the prior study’s finding: over a period spanning more than sixty years, the Supreme
296. See Mandel et al., supra note 164, at 966–68 (noting little difference in
public perception across intellectual property fields with respect to a variety of
factors).
297. Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence from A Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613, 615 (2015) (“Many believe the root cause of the
patent system’s dysfunction is that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO
or Agency) is issuing too many invalid patents that unnecessarily drain consumer welfare, stunt productive research, and unreasonably extract rents from
innovators.”); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW.
U. L. REV. 1495, 1495 (2001) (stating that the PTO has been criticized “for failing to do a serious job of examining patents, thus allowing bad patents to slip
through the system”); Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97
MINN. L. REV. 990, 990–91 (2013) (explaining that the USPTO “has come under
fire for issuing patents of questionable quality. . . . [And] [a]side from being
technically invalid, commentators have argued that such patents are worthless
and burdensome on the patent system”) (footnotes omitted).
298. Sag et al., supra note 5, at 840–42.
299. Id. at 841–42.
300. Supra Part II.B.3.
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Court has been more supportive of stronger copyright protection
than of protection in other fields of intellectual property law.
If Supreme Court jurisprudence is being driven by popular
opinion, the Court’s long-term trend of supporting copyright protection could be coming to an end. The recent pushback against
the SOPA and PIPA legislation included widespread popular opposition to expanding copyright protection. 301 To the extent the
Supreme Court is swayed by these same forces, as indicated by
the present analysis, the Justices may be less accommodating of
copyright protection in the future than they have been historically.
III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF INTERBRANCH
CONFLICT
Part I of this Article presented an empirical analysis demonstrating a divergence between the Supreme Court’s and Congress’s intellectual property activity in the first part of the
twenty-first century. Digging deeper into the data, this divergence arises from the two branches moving in different directions on patent law and trademark law; the branches are in accord on copyright protection. Part II built on this insight to
provide an analysis of the political and social mechanisms that
may be producing Congress and the Supreme Court’s opposing
perspectives. In the intellectual property context, Congress appears to be driven in significant part by special interest group
influence, while the Supreme Court’s decisions tend to reflect
elite popular opinion. Part III shifts from uncovering new evidence and trends to a normative examination of what these findings mean for intellectual property law. The conflict between
Congress and the Supreme Court has significant implications for
governmental efficiency, majoritarian democracy, and achieving
the objectives of intellectual property law.
A. GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCY
One inference from the extended breach between the
branches of government is that it produces high transaction
costs for settling law. Our government is designed as a system of
checks and balances under which it is appropriate for the Su-

301. Evan Engstrom, Five Years Later: What the SOPA/PIPA Protest Meant
for Tech, ENGINE (Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.engine.is/news/category/five-years
-later-what-the-sopapipa-protest-meant-for-tech; supra Part II.A.2.

864

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[102:803

preme Court to strike down unconstitutional laws, and for Congress to override non-constitutionally based Supreme Court interpretations of law to better achieve congressional intent. 302
But, when the government is functioning as it is traditionally
conceived, these instances should be relatively rare and not play
out continuously across entire fields of law. 303
Some models of judicial decision-making hypothesize that
courts’ appropriate role is to fine-tune broad congressional legislation that cannot be comprehensive due to a variety of legislative practicalities. 304 In this view, the Judicial and Legislative
Branches are not in tension; rather, courts step in to fill a void
left by necessarily incomplete legislation. 305 If the incompletelegislation hypothesis was the full explanation for intellectual
property law, however, one would expect the Supreme Court
cases to be balanced between strengthening and weakening
owner rights. The strong bias displayed in the data towards
weakening protection, particularly in contrast to the thrust of
legislative activity, contradicts this neutral explanation.
Both Congress and the Supreme Court are very expensive
governmental bodies. 306 Legislation is costly and slow. 307 Any
space on the Supreme Court’s docket is a precious resource, as

302. WILLIAM J. RICH, 3 MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 37:1 (3d ed. 2011);
see Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of
Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1195, 1203–04 (2014); David H. Moore, Taking Cues
from Congress: Judicial Review, Congressional Authorization, and the Expansion of Presidential Power, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1019, 1027–28 (2015).
303. Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional
Overrides of Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92
TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1331–41 (2014) (reporting a low background rate of congressional overrides of Supreme Court decisions, with some increase starting in
1974, a particularly high rate from 1991–1998, and a very low rate since 1998);
Ryan Eric Emenaker, Constitutional Interpretation and Congressional Overrides, 3 J.L. 197, 203 (2013) (reporting a historical congressional override rate
of less than one a year from 1803 to 2010); Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, The Supreme Court, and Congress, 86 S. CAL. L.
REV. 205, 209 (2013) (reporting that Congress passed overrides of Supreme
Court statutory decisions fewer than three times per Term from 2001–2012).
304. Tonja Jacobi, The Role of Politics and Economics in Explaining Variation in Litigation Rates in the U.S. States, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 207–13 (2009).
305. Id.; Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A New Structural Analysis of
Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 401
(2005).
306. STEVEN S. SMITH ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 328 (8th ed. 2013);
Michael W. Bowers & Richard C. Cortner, Financing Constitutional Litigation:
Pursuing the Watergate Principle, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 573, 573 (1987).
307. SMITH ET AL., supra note 306, at 105–06.
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the Court hears less than ninety cases a year. 308 To the extent
that a relatively similar level of patent or trademark protection
could be achieved simply by both branches acting less, the government could save substantial resources and free each body to
attend to other pressing needs.
Obviously, the intellectual property statutes and judicial decisions at issue here are not precise trade-offs in terms of protection (with the clear exception of Congress’s legislative override
of the Supreme Court’s Moseley decision), 309 but the conceptual
point remains the same. Given the breadth of many of the Supreme Court’s decisions, the variety of Congress’s legislation,
and the consistently contrary approaches of each branch in patent and trademark law, the body of law-making over the past
fourteen years in these fields cannot be written off as each
branch fine-tuning in complement to each other. Rather, the two
branches of government appear to be expending significant resources in an oppositional mire.
B. MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY
From the perspective of democratic values, whether the Supreme Court’s activity in intellectual property cases over the
past fourteen years is a beneficial or harmful development depends significantly on one’s view of Congress’s legislative function and motivation in passing intellectual property laws. Congress is designed under the Constitution to be the more
representative branch of government and is expected to reflect
the popular will.310 As discussed above, however, there are myriad practical realities of legislative action that often preclude
Congress from representing constituents’ best interests or acting
in a manner that reflects their democratic will. 311 Where Congress’s democratic functioning breaks down, such as when it legislates in response to special interest preferences rather than
based on constituent interests or legislators’ view of what is best
308. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 868 (2004); Nancy
Morawetz, Counterbalancing Distorted Incentives in Supreme Court Pro Bono
Practice: Recommendations for the New Supreme Court Pro Bono Bar and Public Interest Practice Communities, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 131, 139 (2011); The Supreme Court at Work, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, https://www
.supremecourt.gov/about/courtatwork.aspx.
309. See supra Part I.B.1.
310. Alexander Tsesis, Self-Government and the Declaration of Independence, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 693, 724, 731 (2012).
311. Lain, supra note 234, at 157; supra Part II.A.2.
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for society, it is no longer operating in its designed majoritarian
role.312
Ironically, in these circumstances, the Supreme Court may
be better able than Congress to reflect the will of the majority. 313
The empirical evidence and political theory analyzed above indicate that the Supreme Court is often responsive to popular opinion.314 Regardless of whether this response occurs because the
Supreme Court is actively pursuing public preferences in an effort to maintain legitimacy or (as the evidence in the intellectual
property cases suggest) because the Justices are members of the
public, the outcome is the same. Under such conditions, the Supreme Court might be more likely to promote majoritarian outcomes than Congress.315
This approach may appear particularly appropriate to the
extent Congress is perceived as captured by special interests.
One goal of the Framers of the Constitution in designing a system of government with separation of powers was to address the
problem of faction.316 To the extent Congress is controlled by special interests, it is fitting for the Court to step in and protect the
public interest from factional self-interest. Attributing the
Court’s intellectual property decision-making to such proper
democratic functioning, however, is likely too rosy-eyed a view.
If the Court is intentionally protecting the public interest in patent and trademark cases, it is hard to understand how the Court
could view Congress’s copyright legislation as less influenced by
special interests.
An alternative explanation is that the Supreme Court offers
an outlet for majoritarian democratic results because passing
legislation in Congress is often extremely difficult. 317 There are

312. Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights,
85 CORNELL L. REV. 1529, 1553 (2000); Lain, supra note 234, at 115–16.
313. Lain, supra note 234, at 117.
314. See supra Part II.B.3.
315. Lain, supra note 234, at 117.
316. DAN T. COENEN, THE STORY OF THE FEDERALIST: HOW HAMILTON AND
MADISON RECONCEIVED AMERICA 84, 96–97, 158, 269 n.21 (2007).
317. Jacobi, supra note 304, at 207–10; Lain, supra note 234, at 157–58;
Terri Peretti, Democracy-Assisting Judicial Review and the Challenge of Partisan Polarization, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 843, 844–45, 857–58 (2014).
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many reasons why it is very hard to get a bill, even a well-supported bill, through Congress.318 Supreme Court decision-making, on the other hand, is more fluid and often faster. 319 Under
this view, where issues arise for which there is popular will but
legislative inaction, pressure on the Supreme Court to act may
arise precisely because Congress is not responding to the will of
the people. 320 Supreme Court decisions consistent with public
opinion in these circumstances could achieve what Congress
should have done in the first instance, but could not. Thus, the
Supreme Court may effectively achieve democratic-like outcomes, not through majoritarian processes, but by producing majoritarian results (or, micro-public majoritarian results). 321
The nuance in this final point is an important one. Even
where the Supreme Court helps to achieve majoritarian preferences, it still is not acting in a democratic manner. 322 Reflecting
popular will does not change the fact that the Court is not popularly elected. This difference raises a fundamental question
about the structure of government: Is it enough that the system
achieves a majoritarian result, or does government have to
achieve that result in the desired democratic manner? It is potentially problematic that the Supreme Court cedes to popular
will because this indicates that the Court may be abdicating its
constitutional role of checking Congress and the President. 323 Alexander Hamilton recognized the Supreme Court as “an excellent barrier” against “the encroachments and oppressions of the
representative body,” “an essential safeguard against the effects
of occasional ill humors in the society.” 324 In other words, even if
the Supreme Court achieves the majoritarian result, doing so
could threaten the Constitution’s model of government because
there is no longer any entity guarding against the potential tyranny of the majority. 325 These lofty concerns may be less of an
318. E.g., John Cannan, A Legislative History of the Affordable Care Act:
How Legislative Procedure Shapes Legislative History, 105 L. LIBR. J. 131, 133–
35 (2013); Peretti, supra note 317, at 857–58; Barbara Sinclair, Is Congress Now
the Broken Branch?, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 703, 718–19 (2014).
319. Lain, supra note 234, at 157.
320. Id. at 168.
321. Id. at 117.
322. See Strauss, supra note 246, at 903.
323. Id. at 905–06.
324. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465, 470 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
325. Adam Burton, Pay No Attention to the Men Behind the Curtain: The
Supreme Court, Popular Culture, and the Countermajoritarian Problem,
73 UMKC L. REV. 53, 56 (2004) (“ The framers justified the judiciary’s power to
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issue in intellectual property law than in fundamental rights
cases, but the intellectual property decisions provide new evidence that this concern is a real one. Those who believe that
proper democratic procedure forms the backbone of a well-functioning society will not be satisfied with the Supreme Court
achieving majoritarian ends if it is not being accomplished
through appropriate democratic means.
C. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW
The core question for intellectual property law is identifying
which branch of government, Congress or the Supreme Court, is
more likely to effect intellectual property laws that achieve socially desirable objectives. The answer to this question turns
somewhat on whether one takes an instrumentalist or deontological view of the goals of intellectual property law.
The Intellectual Property Clause of the Constitution grants
Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts” by enacting copyright and patent laws.326 Consistent with this consequentialist preamble, the dominant view
of intellectual property law and policy in the United States has
often been that intellectual property law exists in order to incentivize creative and innovative activity. 327 The incentive theory of
intellectual property law is based on the rationale that providing
authors and inventors with the potential for intellectual property rights will induce them to engage in greater innovative activity than they would otherwise, from the creation to the production to the commercialization of intellectual works. 328
invalidate legislation as a necessary legal check on popular opinion to protect
minorities against a ‘tyranny of the majority.’”); Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court A “Majoritarian” Institution?, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 103, 105 (2010)
(“For better or worse, the Court does not and cannot protect political minorities,
be they the ‘discrete and insular minorities’ of liberal jurisprudential fame, or
any other kind of minority.”).
326. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
327. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2003) (“[I]t is acknowledged that
analysis and evaluation of intellectual property law are appropriately conducted
within an economic framework that seeks to align that law with the dictates of
economic efficiency.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual
Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2012) (“According to the dominant American theory of intellectual property, copyright and patent laws are premised on
providing creators with . . . incentive[s] to create artistic, scientific, and technological works . . . .”).
328. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 11–14 (5th ed. 2010); Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher
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Other scholars and experts rely on John Locke’s labor theory
of property rights and similar concepts to argue that intellectual
property law exists to protect authors’ and inventors’ natural
rights in their creative works. 329 This deontological perspective
views individuals as automatically entitled to the fruits of their
efforts. 330 Natural rights theory supports intellectual property
protection on the basis that a creator is morally entitled to control the copying and distribution of inventions or artistic creations produced as a result of the creator’s own labor and effort. 331
Under the traditional, romantic view of the branches of government enshrined in the Constitution, those who believe in a
deontological basis might tend to favor Congress as the intellectual property law decision-maker and be wary of Supreme Court
interference. Natural rights in intellectual property law are an
ill-defined concept, and majoritarian preferences could be an appropriate way to define such rights.332 In fact, experts who support natural rights concepts in intellectual property law often
Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 3–4 (2010); Christopher A. Cotropia & James Gibson, The Upside of Intellectual Property’s Downside, 57 UCLA L. REV. 921, 926–27 (2010).
329. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J.
1533, 1540 (1993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77
GEO. L.J. 287, 296–330 (1988) (discussing Locke’s labor theory as it relates to
intellectual property rights).
330. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 34–41
(2011).
331. See Gordon, supra note 329, at 1543 (“[A]ll persons have a duty not to
interfere with the resources others have appropriated or produced by laboring
on the common.”); Hughes, supra note 329, at 297 (“Locke proposes that . . .
there are enough unclaimed goods so that everyone can appropriate the objects
of his labors without infringing upon goods that have been appropriated by
someone else.”). There are additional perspectives on the objectives of intellectual property law, such as that it should serve expressive ends. Fromer, supra
note 327, at 1754–56 (discussing application of personhood theories to patent
law); Hughes, supra note 329, at 330–65 (discussing different theories of selfexpression in intellectual property). Such other perspectives, however, tend to
receive far less support than the ones identified above and are a poor match for
explaining much actual intellectual property law. MERGES, supra note 330, at
34–41; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575, 1597–99 (2003); Fromer, supra note 328, at 1746–51.
332. See Gordon, supra note 329, at 1547, 1549, 1553. Congress’s protection
of intellectual property rights is, of course, distinct from their protection (or not)
of other rights. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing
the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 615–16
(1991) (explaining shifts in Congress’s and the Supreme Court’s positions on
civil rights over time); Serena J. Hoy, Interpreting Equal Protection: Congress,
the Court, and the Civil Rights Acts, 16 J.L. & POL. 381, 383 (2000) (discussing
Congress’s shifting approach to civil rights).
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point to popular opinion and perceptions as evidence corroborating their views about what intellectual property rights should
be. 333
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, may appear more
attractive to consequentialist proponents. Rather than deciding
intellectual property rights based on popular vote, achieving optimal incentives requires balancing the incentive benefits that
intellectual property protection provides against the exclusionary costs that it creates. 334 The Supreme Court, not Congress,
may be better able to engage in this calculated weighing. In support of this perspective, the Supreme Court has affirmed the incentive objectives of intellectual property law in numerous opinions, recognizing the need to balance the incentives of protection
against intellectual property rights “not inhibit[ing] further discovery.” 335
The findings reported here invert this traditional reasoning
about the branches of government. To the extent that Congress
is driven by special interest lobbying rather than majoritarian
333. See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The
Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 1343, 1345–46 (1989) (“ The special burdens scholars place on copyright
may have their origins in public perception. There is often a distrust of copyright
when its compulsions conflict with the usual expectations people have of the
freedoms they should be entitled to exercise over their physical possessions.”)
(footnote omitted). See generally, JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015) (reporting
on attitudes concerning creativity and intellectual property rights from an extensive series of interviews with a variety of people involved in the creative process).
334. Barnett, supra note 184, at 395; Cotropia & Gibson, supra note 328, at
923; Gregory N. Mandel, Leveraging the International Economy of Intellectual
Property, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 736 (2014); Mandel, supra note 34, at 1453–54.
335. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,
1301 (2012); see id. at 1305 (“[T]he promise of exclusive rights provides monetary incentives that lead to creation, invention, and discovery.”); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 223 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he grant of exclusive
rights [in the Intellectual Property clause] is intended to encourage the creativity of ‘Authors and Inventors.’”); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“ The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the
labor of authors, but ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.’”)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“[C]opyright supplies the economic incentive
to create and disseminate ideas.”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (granting patents and copyrights is “intended to
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors”); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (“ The sole interest of the United
States and the primary object in conferring the [copyright] monopoly lie in the
general benefits derived by the public.” (quoting Fox Film Corps. v. Doyal, 286
U.S. 123, 127 (1932))).
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public preferences, it will be a poor representative for defining
natural rights in intellectual property works. Congress will pass
laws to satisfy rent-seeking industry interests rather than the
natural rights of authors and inventors. Conversely, the Supreme Court may now look more attractive to natural rights proponents, as it is the governmental body that actually adheres
more closely to the public will. 336 As the Court appears to decide
patent and trademark cases in accord with public opinion, regardless of what the Court writes about incentives in its decisions, the Court may actually be a good mechanism for setting
natural rights consistent with popular preferences.
Though Congress may no longer appear attractive to deontists, instrumentalists may want to take a second look. Rather
than bending to popular preferences, Congress appears more responsive to industry preferences, and industry will often have
better information and expertise concerning how to achieve
greater incentives. For industries in which there are strong representatives who want to strengthen and strong representatives
who want to weaken intellectual property rights in order to support innovation, this buffeting from each side could produce law
that actually takes both the benefits and costs of intellectual
property into account. 337 Current patent law debates may provide such an example. With powerful industry representatives
on both sides of the issues, the only laws that can get passed may
be ones that are relatively accommodating to innovation in multiple contexts. 338 This argument could easily be overstated. As
noted earlier, legislation is difficult to pass and powerful industry groups on both sides of the debate may uniformly favor certain laws that simply provide barriers to entry, but are likely
harmful to innovation. 339 Overall, however, Congress may be
more accommodating to incentive pressures in certain circumstances than originally thought.
In the end, neither instrumentalists nor deontists will likely
feel satisfied with either the Supreme Court or Congress as a
reliable option for setting intellectual property law and policy.
Special interest group influence is a poor way to decide intellec-

336. The Court is certainly informed of special interest positions, as the
wealth of amicus briefs filed with the Court attests, but does not appear to be
as influenced by such positions as Congress. See supra notes 280, 294.
337. Mandel, supra note 184, at 55.
338. See supra Part II.A.2.
339. See supra Part II.C.
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tual property rights, but majoritarian popular preferences on issues implicating specialized knowledge may not be much better.
CONCLUSION
This analysis of Supreme Court and congressional decisionmaking in intellectual property law in the first part of the
twenty-first century does not paint a rosy picture. The Supreme
Court and Congress appear fractured concerning intellectual
property law and neither branch appears to be functioning in its
proper governmental role. Congress seems to have abandoned its
position of serving as a representative of the people on intellectual property issues, and the Supreme Court appears to have abdicated its responsibility to guard minority interests against the
tyranny of the majority. There is, however, a potential silver lining in this cloud of weak institutional competence, one that may
be welcome news for intellectual property advocates and scholars.
As discussed above, the Supreme Court studies indicate that
the Court tends not to follow majority public preferences in general, but rather the opinion of the micro-publics that the Justices
are a part of. 340 In fact, when Supreme Court decisions deviate
from mainstream public opinion, they tend to deviate in the direction of elite popular preferences.341 The elite public opinion
that appears to influence Supreme Court Justice voting the most
is likely that of well-educated, legally sophisticated actors. 342
This relationship provides a direct avenue for intellectual property scholars and experts to help influence the development of
intellectual property law. One does not need to have the ear of a
Supreme Court Justice directly to have an effect; influencing intellectual property perceptions among legally elite groups may
be enough to cause a shift in the course of the law. Contrary to
the received wisdom, 343 legal scholarship and scholarly advocacy
may be a successful avenue for legal change.

340. See Lain, supra note 234, at 164 (noting that Supreme Court Justices
are not average members of the public, but elites); Yates et al., supra note 234,
at 139–40.
341. Lain, supra note 234, at 164–65; Strauss, supra note 246, at 895.
342. Baum & Devins, supra note 257, at 1537–38; Strauss, supra note 246,
at 895.
343. See generally Gerald N. Rosenberg, Romancing the Court, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 563, 563 (2009) (critiquing the “potential role of the Supreme Court of the
United States as an agent of progressive social change”); Diane P. Wood, Legal
Scholarship for Judges, 124 YALE L.J. 2529 (2015) (discussing the disconnect
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APPENDIX A
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

Case
Halo Electronics
v. Pulse Electronics, 136 S.
Ct. 1923 (2016)

Holding
Enhanced damages
for willful infringement are available for
egregious activity “beyond typical infringement.”

Field
Patent

Effect
Strengthens

Vote
8–0

Cuozzo Speed
Techs., L.L.C. v.
Lee, 136 S. Ct.
2131 (2016)

Decision to institute
IPR is unreviewable;
PTO may apply
broadest reasonable
construction to patent
claims in IPR.

Patent

Weakens

8–0

Kirtsaeng v.
John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 136
S. Ct. 1979
(2016)

Attorney’s fees decisions consider all circumstances, including
objective reasonableness of losing party’s
position.

Copyright

Neutral

8–0

Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t,
LLC, 135 S. Ct.
2401 (2015)

A patent holder cannot charge royalties
for the use of an invention after the patent has expired.

Patent

Weakens

6–3

Commil USA,
L.L.C. v. Cisco
Systems, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 1920
(2015)

Accused infringer’s
subjective belief that
a patent is invalid is
not a defense to an induced infringement
claim.

Patent

Strengthens

6–2

between legal scholarship and the judicial decision-making process); The Honorable John G. Roberts Jr., Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Conversation at Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference, C-SPAN (June 25, 2011), https://
c-span.org/video/?300203-1/conversation-chief-justice-roberts&start=694 (commenting that legal scholarship plays little to no role in judicial decision-making). Contra Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the Academy Led Patent Law Astray?,
32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 2–9, 42) (arguing
that prevalent views among legal scholars are cited by courts and other policymakers).
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B & B Hardware, Inc. v.
Hargis Indus.,
Inc., 135 S. Ct.
1293 (2015)

TTAB adjudication
precludes a party
from arguing the
same issues before a
district court.

Trademark

Neutral

7–2

Hana Fin., Inc.
v. Hana Bank,
135 S. Ct. 907
(2015)

Whether an older
trademark can be
tacked to a newer one
for priority purposes
is a question of fact.

Trademark

Neutral

9–0

Teva Pharms.
USA, Inc. v.
Sandoz, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 831
(2015)

District court resolution of subsidiary
facts in claim construction is reviewed
for clear error.

Patent

Neutral

7–2

American
Broadcasting
Companies, Inc.
v. Aereo, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2498
(2014)

Retransmission of a
television broadcast
over the Internet is a
public performance
for purposes of the
Copyright Act.

Copyright

Strengthens

6–3

Alice Corp. v.
CLS Bank Int’l,
134 S. Ct. 2347
(2014)

A computer-implemented method for
exchanging financial
obligations is a patent-ineligible abstract idea.

Patent

Weakens

9–0

Limelight Networks, Inc. v.
Akamai Techs.,
Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2111 (2014)

No liability for inducing patent infringement where steps
were not performed
by a single party.

Patent

Weakens

9–0

Nautilus, Inc. v.
Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2120
(2014)

Ambiguous patent
claims with multiple
reasonable interpretations are indefinite.

Patent

Weakens

9–0

Petrella v.
Metro-GoldwynMayer, Inc., 134
S. Ct. 1962
(2014)

Laches do not bar infringement action
brought within Copyright Act’s statute of
limitations.

Copyright

Strengthens

6–3
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Octane Fitness
v. Icon Health
and Fitness, 134
S. Ct. 1749
(2014)

An “exceptional case”
for fee-shifting purposes is one that
stands out with respect to a party’s litigation.

Patent

Weakens

9–0

Highmark, Inc.
v. Allcare
Health Mgmt.
Sys., Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1744 (2014)

A district court’s determination that a
case is exceptional is
reviewed for abuse of
discretion.

Patent

Neutral

9–0

Medtronic, Inc.
v. Mirowski
Family Ventures, L.L.C.,
134 S. Ct. 843
(2014)

The patentee bears
the burden of persuasion when a licensee
seeks a declaratory
judgment of noninfringement.

Patent

Weakens

9–0

Federal Trade
Commission v.
Actavis, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 2223
(2013)

Patent case reverse
payment settlements
may unreasonably diminish competition in
violation of antitrust
laws.

Patent

Weakens

5–3

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2107
(2013)

Isolated DNA sequences are not patent eligible products
of nature.

Patent

Weakens

9–0

Bowman v.
Monsanto Co.,
569 U.S. 278
(2013)

Patent exhaustion
does not permit the
reproduction of legally purchased, patented seeds.

Patent

Strengthens

9–0

Kirtsaeng v.
John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 568
U.S. 519 (2013)

The first-sale doctrine
applies to copies of
copyrighted works
that are lawfully acquired abroad.

Copyright

Weakens

6–3
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Gunn v. Minton,
568 U.S. 251
(2013)

State courts can have
jurisdiction over
claims alleging legal
malpractice in a patent case.

Patent

Neutral

9–0

Already L.L.C.
d/b/a Yums v.
Nike, Inc., 568
U.S. 85 (2013)

A trademark owner’s
covenant not to sue a
defendant deprives
the court of Article III
jurisdiction.

Trademark

Strengthens

9–0

Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S.
431 (2012)

There are no particular limitations on a
patent applicant’s
ability to introduce
new evidence in a section 145 proceeding.

Patent

Strengthens

9–0

Caraco Pharm.
Labs., Ltd. v.
Novo Nordisk
A/S, 566 U.S.
399 (2012)

Generic drug manufacturer can assert a
counterclaim challenging patentee’s
product description as
overbroad.

Patent

Weakens

9–0

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus
Labs., Inc, 566
U.S. 66 (2012)

Claims directed to
drug administration
decision are not patent-eligible subject
matter natural laws.

Patent

Weakens

9–0

Golan v. Holder,
565 U.S. 302
(2012)

Restoring copyright
status to certain foreign works did not violate the Copyright
Clause of the Constitution.

Copyright

Strengthens

6–2

Microsoft Corp.
v. i4i Ltd.
P’ship, 564 U.S.
91 (2011)

An invalidity defense
to patent infringement must be proved
by clear and convincing evidence.

Patent

Strengthens

8–0

2017]

877

INSTITUTIONAL FRACTURE

Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ. v.
Roche Molecular
Sys., Inc., 563
U.S. 776 (2011)

Bayh–Dole Act does
not automatically confer federally-funded
inventions to federal
contractors.

Patent

Neutral

7–2

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v.
SEB S.A., 563
U.S. 754 (2011)

Induced infringement
requires knowledge of
infringement, which
can include willful
blindness to infringement.

Patent

Neutral

8–1

Costco Wholesale Corp. v.
Omega S.A., 562
U.S. 40 (2010)

[Split vote; did not decide effect of first sale
doctrine on foreign
goods].

Copyright

Neutral

4–4

Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S.
593 (2010)

Method of hedging
losses is not patent-eligible subject matter
as an abstract idea.

Patent

Weakens

9–0

Reed Elsevier,
Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S.
154 (2010)

Federal court has jurisdiction over infringement claims
concerning unregistered works.

Copyright

Strengthens

5–3

Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG
Elecs., Inc., 553
U.S. 617 (2008)

Patent exhaustion applies to sale of component that embodies a
patent’s essential features.

Patent

Weakens

9–0

KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc.,
550 U.S. 398
(2007)

Prior art may be combined in the nonobviousness analysis
where there was a
reason to combine.

Patent

Weakens

9–0

Microsoft Corp.
v. AT&T Corp.,
550 U.S. 437
(2007)

There is no U.S. liability for export of
master disk to install
U.S. patented software on foreign computers.

Patent

Weakens

7–1

878

[102:803

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

MedImmune,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549
U.S. 118 (2007)

A licensee need not
terminate or breach
its license prior to
seeking declaratory
judgment of patent invalidity.

Patent

Weakens

8–1

eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S.
388 (2006)

The traditional fourfactor test applies to
determine the award
of a permanent injunction for patent infringement.

Patent

Weakens

9–0

Unitherm Food
Sys., Inc. v.
Swift-Eckrich,
Inc., 546 U.S.
394 (2006)

Party’s failure to
move for a new trial
after verdict precludes it from seeking
one for insufficiency
of the evidence.

Patent

Neutral

7–2

Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S.
913 (2005)

Distribution of a device with the object of
promoting its use to
infringe creates liability for infringement
by third-parties.

Copyright

Strengthens

9–0

Merck KGaA v.
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,
545 U.S. 193
(2005)

Use of patented compounds in preclinical
studies is exempt
from infringement liability if they may be
subject of FDA submission.

Patent

Weakens

9–0

K.P. Permanent
Make-Up, Inc.
v. Lasting Impression I, Inc.,
543 U.S. 111
(2004)

Fair use defense does
not require a party to
demonstrate an absence of a likelihood
of confusion.

Trademark

Weakens

9–0

Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 539 U.S.
23 (2003)

Lanham Act does not
prevent the unaccredited copying of an uncopyrighted work.

Trademark

Weakens

9–0
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Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue,
Inc., 537 U.S.
418 (2003)

Federal Trademark
Dilution Act (FTDA)
requires a showing of
actual dilution, not
simply a likelihood of
dilution.

Trademark

Weakens

9–0

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186 (2003)

Copyright Term Extension Act does not
violate the Constitution’s “limited times”
requirement.

Copyright

Strengthens

7–2

APPENDIX B
CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION
Name of Law
Defend Trade
Secrets Act of
2016, Pub. L.
No. 114-153, 130
Stat. 376

Primary Effects
Creates a private cause of
action for trade secret theft
in federal court; remedies include seizure to prevent further dissemination.

Field
Trade Secret

Effect
Strengthens

Trade Facilitation and Trade
Enforcement Act
of 2015, Pub. L.
No. 114-125, 130
Stat. 122

Enables the DHS to better
restrict, coordinate activity
on, and provide information
on the import and export of
goods that infringe copyrights.

Copyright

Strengthens

Trade Facilitation and Trade
Enforcement Act
of 2015, Pub. L.
No. 114-125, 130
Stat. 122

Enables the DHS to better
restrict, coordinate activity
on, and provide information
on the import and export of
goods that infringe trademarks.

Trademark

Strengthens

Collectible Coin
Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 113288, 128 Stat.
3281 (2014)

Enhances trademark owner
rights in connection with unauthorized, trademark infringing, collectibles.

Trademark

Strengthens
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Pub. L. No. 113227, 128 Stat.
2114 (2014)

Allows certain law students
to practice patent law before
the USPTO on a pro-bono
basis.

Patent

Neutral

Pub. L. No. 113227, 128 Stat.
2114 (2014)

Allows certain law students
to practice trademark law
before the USPTO on a probono basis.

Trademark

Neutral

STELA Reauthorization Act
of 2014, Pub. L.
No. 113-200, 128
Stat. 2060

Extends provisions of the
Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act
through 2019.

Copyright

Neutral

An Act to correct
and improve . . .
provisions of
Leahy-Smith
America Invents
Act and title 35
. . ., Pub. L. No.
112-274, 126
Stat. 2456
(2013)

Administrative and funding
adjustments at the PTO;
technical changes to transitional program for covered
business method patents
and joinder of parties.

Patent

Neutral

An Act to correct
and improve . . .
provisions of
Leahy-Smith
America Invents
Act and title 35
. . ., Pub. L. No.
112-274, 126
Stat. 2456
(2013)

Administrative funding adjustments at the PTO, including using patent and
trademark fees interchangeably to cover proportionate
PTO costs.

Trademark

Neutral

Foreign and
Economic Espionage Penalty
Enhancement
Act of 2012,
Pub. L. No. 112269, 126 Stat.
2442

Increased the fines available
as penalties for economic espionage.

Trade Secret

Strengthens
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Theft of Trade
Secrets Clarification Act of
2012, Pub. L.
No. 112-236, 126
Stat. 1627

Prohibits the theft of trade
secrets taken for intended
(not just actual) use and expands the definition of a
trade secret to include information related to services.

Trade Secret

Strengthens

Leahy-Smith
America Invents
Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011)

Myriad changes, including
shifting from a “first to invent” to a “first inventor to
file” system and developing
new post-grant oppositions.

Patent

Mixed
(see Part
I.B.4)

Leahy-Smith
America Invents
Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, 125
Stat. 284 (2011)

Minor changes to trademark
law concerning administration at the PTO.

Trademark

Neutral

Copyright
Cleanup, Clarification, and Corrections Act of
2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-295, 124
Stat. 3180

Among other amendments,
provides that distribution of
a phonorecord before 1978 is
not publication of the work
embodied therein.

Copyright

Strengthens

Satellite Television Extension
and Localism
Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111175, 124 Stat.
1218

Updated and reauthorized
satellite carrier and cable
statutory licenses in part to
account for digital broadcast
television transition.

Copyright

Neutral

Continuing Extension Act of
2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-157, 124
Stat. 1116

Amended Communications
Act of 1934 to extend moratorium on copyright liability
for certain subscribers of
satellite TV.

Copyright

Neutral

Trademark
Technical and
Conforming
Amendment Act
of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-146, 124
Stat. 66

Among other changes, permits trademark owners to
correct certain deficiencies
in post registration maintenance.

Trademark

Strengthens
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Temporary Extension Act of
2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-144, 124
Stat. 42

Amended Communications
Act of 1934 to extend moratorium on copyright liability
for certain subscribers of
satellite TV.

Copyright

Neutral

Department of
Defense Appropriations Act,
2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-118, 123
Stat. 3409

Extended provisions of Copyright Act and Communications Act permitting satellite
television providers to retransmit certain network
programming.

Copyright

Neutral

United States
Capital Police
Administrative
Technical Corrections Act of
2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-145, 124
Stat. 49

Authorizes the Director of
the USPTO to shift funds
from trademark registrations to patent activities under certain conditions.

Trademark

Neutral

United States
Capital Police
Administrative
Technical Corrections Act of
2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-145, 124
Stat. 49

Authorizes the Director of
the USPTO to shift funds
from trademark registrations to patent activities under certain conditions.

Patent

Neutral

Webcaster Settlement Act of
2009, Pub. L.
No. 111-36, 123
Stat. 1926

Defines “webcaster’ for provisions relating to sound recordings via webcasting.

Copyright

Neutral

Webcaster Settlement Act of
2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-435, 122
Stat. 4974

Allows internet radio stations and streaming services
to negotiate rates directly
with record companies.

Copyright

Neutral

Vessel Hull Design Protection
Amendments of
2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-434, 122
Stat. 4972

Amends copyright law to
specify that the design of a
vessel's hull, deck, or combination is copyright protected.

Copyright

Strengthens
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Prioritizing Resources and Organization for
Intellectual
Property Act of
2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-403, 122
Stat. 4256

Prohibits the transshipment
or exportation of counterfeit
goods under the Lanham Act
and increases trademark seizure damages provisions.

Trademark

Strengthens

Prioritizing Resources and Organization for
Intellectual
Property Act of
2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-403, 122
Stat. 4256

Created a safe harbor for
registration errors, allows
impoundment of records during infringement action, prohibits export of copies without permission.

Copyright

Strengthens

A bill to amend
title 35, United
States Code and
the Trademark
Act of 1946 . . .,
Pub. L. No. 110313, 122 Stat.
3014 (2008)

Transferred authority to appoint administrative patent
judges from the Director of
the PTO to the Secretary of
Commerce.

Patent

Neutral

A bill to amend
title 35, United
States Code and
the Trademark
Act of 1946 . . .,
Pub. L. No. 110313, 122 Stat.
3014 (2008)

Transferred authority to appoint administrative trademark judges from the Director of the PTO to the
Secretary of Commerce.

Trademark

Neutral

Trademark Dilution Revision
Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109312, 120 Stat.
1730

Amended trademark dilution law to allow actions
based on likelihood of dilution and clarify famous mark
definition as based on general public.

Trademark

Strengthens
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Copyright Royalty Judges Program Technical
Corrections Act,
Pub. L. No. 109303, 120 Stat.
1478 (2006)

Amends administrative provisions concerning Copyright
Royalty Judges, including
that they are subject to the
Administrative Procedure
Act.

Copyright

Neutral

Energy Policy
Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 10958, 119 Stat. 594

Concerns the Office of Scientific and Technical Information; rare instances for
Department of Energy acquisition of background intellectual property.

Patent

Neutral

Family Entertainment and
Copyright Act of
2005, Pub. L.
No. 109-9, 119
Stat. 218

Increases penalties for copyright infringement to prevent filming movies in theaters and unlicensed early
release of movies and software.

Copyright

Strengthens

Intellectual
Property Protection and Courts
Amendments
Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108482, 118 Stat.
3912

Lowers standard for willful
copyright infringement concerning domain name registration; increases penalties
regarding counterfeit goods.

Copyright

Strengthens

Intellectual
Property Protection and Courts
Amendments
Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108482, 118 Stat.
3912

Lowers standard for willful
trademark infringement concerning domain name registration.

Trademark

Strengthens

Cooperative Research and
Technology Enhancement
(CREATE) Act
of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-453, 118
Stat. 3596

Provides that patentability
is not precluded by obviousness for certain situations
involving team research under joint research agreements.

Patent

Strengthens
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Satellite Home
Viewer Extension and Reauthorization Act
of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-447, 118
Stat. 3393

Extends and expands provisions of the Satellite Home
Viewer Improvement Act to
facilitate satellite television
industry's transition to digital signals.

Copyright

Neutral

Individuals with
Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEA)
of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-446, 118
Stat. 2647

Exempts from copyright liability certain instructional
materials for individuals
with disabilities used in elementary or secondary
schools.

Copyright

Weakens

Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform
Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108419, 118 Stat.
2341

Replaced the royalty arbitration process with three permanent Copyright Royalty
Judges to be appointed by
the Librarian of Congress.

Copyright

Neutral

An Act to improve the United
States Code,
Pub. L. No. 108178, 117 Stat.
2637 (2003)

Minor administrative
amendments concerning the
PTO.

Patent

Neutral

Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement,
and Modernization Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108173, 117 Stat.
2066

Requires more detailed
statements for paragraph IV
abbreviated new drug application certifications and limits amendment opportunities.

Patent

Strengthens

Small Webcaster
Settlement Act
of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-321, 116
Stat. 2780

Allows small webcasters and
copyright holders to enter
voluntary licenses and permits SoundExchange to negotiate on behalf of copyright
holders.

Copyright

Neutral
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21st Century
Department of
Justice Appropriations Authorization Act,
Pub. L. No. 107273, 116 Stat.
1758 (2002)

Reauthorized the PTO and
clarified that third-party requesters can invoke inter
partes reexamination in
light of new evidence.

Patent

Neutral

21st Century
Department of
Justice Appropriations Authorization Act,
Pub. L. No. 107273, 116 Stat.
1758 (2002)

In addition to new reporting
requirements, extended an
exemption from copyright liability for instructional
broadcasting to distance
learning.

Copyright

Weakens

